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Chapter 1
Introduction
(Calvin and Hobbes, Watterson (2006))
This comic-strip by Calvin and Hobbes is an example for the intrinsic effort-
allocation of an ”agent” not always being in line with the desired alloca-
tion by the ”principal”. The basic but crucial question of how to design
an incentive scheme that endorses a certain agent behavior has given rise
to extensive economic research in the past. To understand and describe
the influence of incentives properly, the individual characteristics of each
worker (e.g., ability, age, labor-market experience) have to be considered.
Cognitive and motivational mechanisms also play an important role in
determining how a certain level of compensation translates into job- and
pay-satisfaction.
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Figure 1.1: Guiding framework of my thesis (based on Bonner & Sprinkle
(2002))
Figure 1.1 summarizes this diverse set of effects and mechanisms, based
on a framework suggested by Bonner & Sprinkle (2002). My thesis is struc-
tured along this framework and consists of three main building blocks.
The first of these is the relationship between incentives, allocation of ef-
fort, and task performance. Second, I will analyze how person variables,
i.e., different forms of labor-market experience, influence the agent’s per-
formance. Finally, I discuss the effect of compensation on agent satisfac-
tion, using a model of expectancies and reference-point dependent utility.
I discuss the findings of each of the three chapters in more detail below,
after giving a brief introduction to the data-set I use throughout my work.
The data is on German insurance tied agents1 and was collected in the
first half of 2006. It is based on an online questionnaire among German
insurance companies. A total of 9,386 insurance tied agents from 10 large
German insurance companies participated in the survey (for more infor-
1 An ”official” definition can be found in the German commercial code (HGB, §84 Abs.
1), which defines tied agents as ”independent tradesmen that act as an agent for
another company. ”Independent” means someone, who is generally free to decide
which tasks to perform and how to spend his time” (see also Heinz (1999))
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mation regarding set-up and concept of the questionnaire, see also Vogler
(2009)). The data was sanitized, meaning that both the agents and the
companies remained anonymous. As the level of information provided
differs among the ten companies, not all observations could be used in the
analyses, depending on the research question under consideration. Each
chapter therefore contains a section in which I describe the subset of data
used for the specific analysis. Overall, though, the findings presented in
this work are based on a comparably large number of observations and
therefore can be said to be representative.
One major difference to most of the other works that have been published
in the past is that this focuses on one single industry in one country. The
concentration on this specific industry and occupation, enables us to study
in detail the effects under consideration due to the special nature of the
compensation scheme of insurance agents, which is almost entirely vari-
able, based on commission rates. Therefore, a clear link exists between
performance and pay. This is a big advantage compared to other stud-
ies that cover a broad range of occupations and industries. As already
stressed by Goette et al. (2004), an environment in which workers are free
to choose when and how much to work and where a salient relationship
between their effort and their income exists, is the ideal context in which
to test the standard, neoclassical model of intertemporal labor supply. In
this sense, I do not consider insurance tied agents an artificial case, but
rather a job and industry that is perfectly suited for economic research.
As we will refer to the compensation system applicable to German insur-
ance tied agents frequently in the subsequent chapters, I will now briefly
present the general set-up of their compensation system.
The four components of the agents compensation are (i) new business
commissions, (ii) recurring commissions, (iii) bonification and (iv) fixed
salary and subsidies.2 The insurance company pays these components
to the agent, with the commissions directly related to new business gen-
erated and the total portfolio managed, whilst the bonification is paid for
2 I will refer to these four components also as NBC, RC, Boni and Sal throughout the
text, especially in the column-headers of regression tables
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achieving or surpassing previously agreed goals. The fixed salary/subsidies
component is usually paid only in the first couple of years after an agent
joins the insurer, in order to help the agent sustain a minimal level of
earnings (see Beenken (2003) and Damm (1993)). Apart from these purely
monetary incentives, there can also be non-monetary rewards, e.g., travel
vouchers, a watch, or some form of public recognition. Although there
is evidence that these non-financial rewards can be very motivating, as
they conspicuously recognize the agent’s achievements (Dorfman (1976)),
this type of bonification is outside the scope of this work (in line with
Coughlan & Narasimhan (1992)). More information on the compensation
systems of German insurance agents can be found in Cummins & Doherty
(2006) (who focus on non-tied insurance intermediaries), Cupach & Car-
son (2002), Heinz (1999), Ludwig (1994) and Dorfman (1976).
I will now give a brief outline of the chapters of this thesis, including the
main findings of the analyses.
Chapter 2 focuses on the question of how incentives can influence agents’
time allocation and whether they can lead to a change in performance.
Many recent studies have suggested that incentives matter, and that piece-
rates are the best way to endorse the desired behavior (see e.g., Shearer
(2004), Paarsch & Shearer (2000), Lazear (2000) or Lazear (1986)). Empiri-
cal evidence that supports this hypothesis, however, is scarce (see Bonner
et al. (2000)). Alongside the problem of if and how incentives increase the
amount of effort exerted by the agent, there is also the question of how the
effort is allocated. A common hypothesis among practitioners is that there
is always a trade-off between acquiring new customers and caring for ex-
isting ones (see Albers (2006), Cupach & Carson (2002), Albers (1996) or
Sautter (1980)). I use the concept of a multi-task model based on the sem-
inal work by Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) to describe this trade-off be-
tween selling and customer care. Initially, I develop a simple one-period
multi-task model and derive hypotheses regarding the influence of effort
allocation on performance and how commission rates can be used to steer
this allocation. This model is then extended to a 2-period setting where we
include the intertemporal dependencies arising from the portfolio-effect
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(i.e., that extending effort on selling also increases future recurring com-
missions and that a higher retention of customers via an increase in cus-
tomer care effort is also beneficial in the next period). We revisit our hy-
potheses from the one-period model using simulated data and find that
they generally hold for the 2-period case. Second, I test the hypotheses
using data on auto insurance sales of three German insurance companies.
I find a significant positive effect of the time spent on customer care ac-
tivities both on the portfolio size and new business production. The new
business commission rate has a positive effect on selling and a negative ef-
fect on customer care time. The results for the recurring commission rate
are mixed.
In Chapter 3, I turn towards the influence of individual characteristics of
each worker. The human capital theory is well-known and seeks to explain
the relationship between experience and pay, stating that more experience
makes the employee more valuable and should thus lead to higher wages.
Previous research has cast some doubts on this simple relationship and
suggested that the type of experience needs to be differentiated from the
total sum of experience. The analysis presented here leans on the work by
Parent (2000), who found that three categories of experience can be distin-
guished: industry-specific, job-specific and general labor-market experi-
ence (the works by Kambourov & Manovskii (2009), Poletaev & Robinson
(2008) and Gibbons & Waldman (2006) suggest an even finer differenti-
ation into occupational-, skill- or task-specific experience, respectively).
Based on the standard wage model, I test the influence of experience us-
ing the data on tied agents. I find both the expected strong effect of tenure
on pay due to the special structure of agent compensation in this industry,
and that general- and industry-specific labor market experience also have
positive effects. The latter deviate is dependent on the agent’s tenure: it is
strong for agents with low tenure, but becomes rather weak or even neg-
ative for high-tenure agents. A detailed look into the effects on different
compensation components reveals a high degree of diversity in the size
and direction of the experience-related influence on wage. By applying an
instrumental variable (IV) approach (based on Altonji & Shakotko (1987))
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and introducing proxy variables for the job- and industry-match, the chap-
ter also contributes to the discussion regarding the omitted-variable bias
that can arise from using simple OLS instead of IV.
Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the motivational aspects of compensation.
Camerer et al. (1997) found (using data on taxicab drivers) that the expected
wage acts as a reference-point and that performance drops after that target
is met. Similarly, Groot & van Maassen den Brink (1999), found that the
positive effect of higher wages on job satisfaction wears off after some time
(called ”preference drift”). Recent works have found such a reference-
dependent utility not only in employer-employee relationships but also
in other areas of public life (see Clark et al. (2009), Luttmer (2005) and
Stutzer (2004)). One of the most often analyzed phenomena in the context
of reference points is ”loss aversion”: people usually feel that a loss re-
duces their utility far more than a comparable gain would increase it (see
Fehr & Goette (2007), Goette et al. (2004), Tversky & Kahneman (1991) and
Kahneman & Tversky (1979)). Based on this line of thought, I present em-
pirical evidence for the existence of a reference-point for satisfaction with
compensation. Information on the satisfaction (both with pay, and over-
all) of the tied agents is used to test the hypotheses. An ordered probit
regression and a subsequent analysis of the marginal effects is applied to
investigate the influence of compensation on the satisfaction score. I find a
relationship between the agents’ deviation from peer-group compensation
and their satisfaction with pay. Surprisingly, the analysis shows a positive
relation with satisfaction for deviations above the peer-group median but
no statistically significant relation for deviations below the median. These
results run contrary to the common notion of loss aversion presented in
other publications. In line with previous work, no relation is found be-
tween compensation and overall satisfaction.
Overall, the results as presented in the following three chapters support
the notion that there are many influencing factors in the context of pay
and performance. Due to the analysis of one single job and industry, it is
possible to combine different theories that have been proposed in the past
to explain many aspects of human behavior. Further research is needed
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to understand in depth how the findings translate to other industries and
jobs and how social (non-quantitative) preferences may interact with the
evidence presented here.
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Chapter 2
The Relation Between Incentives,
Effort and Performance
2.1 Introduction
A basic assumption in principal-agent problems is that compensation sys-
tems reward the agent for his output and provide a premium for the risk
he accepts. If there is only one task the agent can potentially perform, then
the challenge for the principal is to provide incentives so that the amount
of effort exerted by the agent is maximized (assuming that the effort effi-
ciency is unchanged). In such situations, piece rates are generally found to
be superior to fixed wages (e.g., Shearer (2004), Paarsch & Shearer (2000),
Lazear (2000), or Lazear (1986)). Similar results were already obtained and
summarized by Prendergast (1999) so it seems reasonable to assume that
agents do respond to incentives.
Intuition would suggest that higher incentives lead to higher effort and
therefore higher performance, but there is a lack of empirical evidence and
results of laboratory studies have been quite mixed. Bonner et al. (2000)
state that only half of the studies analyzed showed a significant positive
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effect of incentives on performance (a similar result was also found by
Camerer & Hogarth (1999)). Gneezy & Rustichini (2000) found a positive
effect of higher compensation on performance relative to lower pay (but
the overall performance level may be lower because of the introduction
of compensation, i.e., motivation crowding out, see also Sliwka (2003)).
Camerer et al. (1997) on the other hand find a negative effect of wage in-
crease on the working hours of cab drivers. The studies by Pritchard &
Leo (1973) and Tomporowski et al. (1993) also suggest a negative correla-
tion between incentives and performance.
Recent research has presented an agent-specific, preference-based solution
to those counter-intuitive results. Fehr & Goette (2007) argue that loss-
averse agents have a reference income level, and failure to reach this level
is experienced as a loss (see also Chapter 4 where I investigate the exis-
tence of a reference-point in the case of insurance tied agents). On the other
hand, the marginal utility of income above the reference-point decreases
discontinuously. As a consequence, one could argue that after incentives
are increased, this reference-point is achieved with even less effort and
thus the overall performance drops. Fehr & Goette (2007) find that in the
case of bike messengers (who are paid on a commission-only basis), effort
duration increases whilst the effectiveness decreases. Although the overall
performance still increased in this example, these findings point towards
potential negative effects of an increase of incentives. In general, it must
be said that the effect of the incentive changes seem to depend heavily on
the nature of the task to be performed (see Camerer & Hogarth (1999)).
A recent theory to explain the rather weak relation between incentives and
performance uses the concept of ”fairness”. Fehr et al. (2009) argue that a
wage increase leads to an increased effort only if the wage is perceived as
fair (see also Akerlof & Yellen (1990)). Similarly, MacLeod (2007) suggests
that fairness may be more important than pure profit maximization.
These models, although already quite instructive, lack an important link to
reality: in modern work environments, the agent rarely has only one task
to perform; in most cases, workers are in charge of a broad variety of tasks.
Thus, in contrast to the one-task situation, where the emphasis is mainly
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put on effort duration, there is now an additional challenge to influence
the direction of effort (see Bonner & Sprinkle (2002)). This may lead to
incentives that increase the effort duration, but shift the effort direction to-
wards those tasks that can be clearly measured (Bru¨ggen & Moers (2007),
Fehr & Schmidt (2004)).
As outlined by Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991), the multi-task approach can
be applied to production workers as well as to teachers and many other
jobs. To my knowledge, there is only limited empirical evidence from
real data (i.e., not from laboratory experiments) on how incentives influ-
ence the allocation of time and effort among different tasks. One of the
few works regarding effort direction comes from Brickley & Zimmerman
(2001) who analyzed the effect of a change in organizational incentives on
the teaching ratings and the research output at a top-tier business school.
They find that, after putting more emphasis on teaching ratings, the over-
all score in the classroom evaluations went up whilst the average research
output went down.
I contribute to this new empirical field first by developing a model that
accounts for repeated interactions between the agent and customers over
multiple periods and secondly by analyzing the effect of varying incentive
levels on the effort duration and direction using data on German insurance
agents. As already described in Chapter 1, the largest component of vari-
able compensation is commission that is paid for (i) new contracts sold by
the agent and (ii) customers with a multi-year contract that remain with
the insurance company without cancelation of their policy within this pe-
riod. Furthermore, depending on the overall performance and the targets
set by the Insurance company, a bonification may be paid out at the end
of the accounting period. This bonification can be either a cash amount
or a non-cash reward. There is evidence that non-financial rewards can be
very motivating, as they conspicuously give the recipient recognition that
they have met their performance objectives (Dorfman (1976)), this type of
bonification is outside the scope of this work.
I focus on commissions, as they account for more than 80%, on average,
of the agent’s total annual compensation (see also Damm (1993)). As com-
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mission rates vary significantly between an insurer’s different products,
I focus on product-specific data. I use auto insurance products as they
can be assumed to be fairly standardized and thus the data from different
insurance companies can be used without large company-specific differ-
ences in the products.
A common hypothesis among practitioners is that there is always a trade-
off between acquiring new customers and caring for existing ones. As
outlined for example by Sautter (1980), it is either that agents lose sight
of their existing customers in order to have more time to sell products
to new ones (see Cupach & Carson (2002) or Albers (1996)) or that those
agents with a broad customer base stop writing new business as they are
already well paid by the recurring commissions (see Albers (2006)). Based
Figure 2.1: Framework for the effects of monetary incentives on effort and
task performance (see also Figure 1.1)
on Figure 1.1, Figure 2.1 shows the different quantities I will analyze in
this chapter and gives a first indication of the potential causal relations
based on the literature review. I will treat the new business and recurring
commission rates as the only steering instruments the principal has avail-
able. Companies seem to be able to influence their agents’ time allocation
between three tasks: customer care, selling and administration.3 Finally,
the way the agent splits his time between the tasks should influence his
performance, which I measure in terms of new business production and
portfolio development.
Understanding the causal relation between incentives, effort allocation
and performance has the potential to improve the effectiveness of com-
3 I will disregard the impact of effort spent on administration in the model, as I assume
that the agent cannot directly influence the amount of administrative work to be
performed. In the empirical results, I control for administrative tasks but focus on
interpreting the effects from customer care and selling
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pensation schemes, not only in the sense of efficiency gains for the princi-
pal but also in terms of the agent’s well-being. Survey results by Graf &
Keese (2000) show that 43% of agents perceive their current compensation
system as ”unfair”.
In the next section, I develop a formal model and derive specific hypothe-
ses regarding the different effects just discussed using both closed-form
solutions (2.2.1) and simulated data (2.2.2). In Section 2.3, I give a brief
introduction into the data-set (2.3.1), test the hypotheses (2.3.2 and 2.3.3)
and discuss the robustness of the results (2.3.4). Section 2.4 summarizes
the findings and concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Theoretical Predictions
In this section, I develop a model to derive the optimal effort allocation of
an agent that has the choice between multiple tasks. The model specifica-
tion leans heavily on the seminal work by Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991).
As in their work, I also focus on a linear-contract, normal-noise, CARA4-
preference setting. Based on the theoretical results, I formulate hypothe-
ses regarding the influence of effort and commission rates on performance
that I test in Section 2.3 with the data-set. I am interested in the optimal
effort allocation of the agent, so I do not discuss the principal’s problem
here and assume that the commission rates are externally set.
I start with a 1-period model (assuming that the agent is completely my-
opic). In the second stage, I extend the model into multiple periods, where
I focus on the 2-period case for the sake of traceability. A closed-form so-
lution for the optimal effort levels of the agent is derived and I discuss the
differences between the 1- and 2-period model based on simulated data.
4 Constant absolut risk aversion
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In all cases, the contract specifies the recurring commission rate αP and
the new business commission rate αN . The environment is assumed to be
static and the firm cannot directly verify the agent’s effort level but the out-
comes are observed by both the company and the agent (compare Daido
(2006)).
In the description of the model, I will rely on the following nomenclature:
Nt ≥ 0 New business of the agent at the end of period t
Pt ≥ 0 Portfolio of the agent at the end of period t
etN ∈ [0, 1] Agent’s effort on selling during period t
etP ∈ [0, 1] Agent’s effort on customer care during period t
τ ∈ [0, 1] Natural churn rate
at ≥ 0 Agent’s fixed salary at the end of period t
αN ∈ [0, 1] New business commission rate
αP ∈ [0, 1] Recurring commission rate
wt ≥ 0 Agent’s total compensation at the end of period t
βN > 0 Scaling factor - Sales effectiveness
κ ≥ 1 Scaling factor - Churn avoidance
cN , cP > 0 Scaling factors - Cost function
s 0 ≤ s < √cNcP Scaling factor - Effort substitution
With this nomenclature at hand, I describe the model as follows:
Nt = βNe
t
N + ²N (2.1)
Pt = Nt + [1− τ(κ− etP )]Pt−1 + Pt−1²P (2.2)
The new business production Nt at the end of period t is assumed to de-
pend on the amount of effort spent on selling by the agent during time
period t subject to some error term ²N ∼ N (0, σ2N).
The portfolio size Pt at the end of period t depends on the amount of new
business generated during the same period and the remainder of the pre-
vious period’s portfolio (Pt−1). I assume that there is a natural churn rate
τ (due to customers changing their insurance company, removing the in-
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sured risk or death of the policyholder). Depending on the amount of ef-
fort the agent invests in customer care, the effect of this churn factor can be
reduced. As effort is scaled to be between 0 and 1, κ in the equation defines
how much of the churn rate can be compensated (i.e., if κ = 1, the agent
could completely neutralize the negative effect of churn on the portfolio by
choosing the maximum customer care effort of 1).5 The introduction of κ
also allows us to account implicitly for ”word-of-mouth” effects (see, e.g.,
Rob & Fishman (2005), Vettas (1997), Dodson & Muller (1978); for ways to
efficiently solve the advection-diffusion problems that often arise in these
settings, see also Widura et al. (2008)). This suggests that an increase of
the customer base should lead to additional new business as existing cus-
tomers recommend the product to their family and friends. Thus, if we
assume that there is a positive relationship between customer base and
new business production, we can write (introducing the new variables η
as the word-of-mouth effect and κ¯ via τκ = τ κ¯− η):
Pt = βNe
t
N + ηPt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:N˜t
+[1− τ(κ¯− etP )]Pt−1 + Pt−1²P
Here, N˜t denotes new business production adjusted for the word-of-mouth
effect. For the sake of traceability, I will not use this explicit form but the
one of equation (2.2) with the word-of-mouth parameter being implicitly
defined via κ.
As in the case of the new business production, I assume that the devel-
opment of the portfolio is not completely deterministic but depends on
some random error term ²P ∼ N (0, σ2P ). In this case, however, the size of
this disturbance will clearly depend on the portfolio size (more customers
means greater volatility in the number of retained customers). I therefore
scale the error term using the portfolio size of the previous period. Re-
garding the covariance between ²N and ²P , I assume that σNP = 0.
After describing the mechanisms of new business production and port-
5 Due to this notation, the effective churn rate is not τ but τ · κ. I nevertheless usually
refer to τ as the churn rate, slightly abusing the notation here
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folio development, we can easily derive the formulation for the agents’
compensation scheme. I introduce a compensation scheme based on a cer-
tain amount of fixed salary (at) and commissions.6 I allow both the fixed
part and the commissions to vary over time7 and write:
wt = at + αNNt + αP (Pt −Nt) (2.3)
The term (Pt − Nt) accounts for the assumption that new business is not
subject to recurring commissions in the year the new business was gener-
ated (i.e., that the agent gets not paid twice in one year for the same con-
tract). Following Bolton & Dewatripont (2005), I define the cost function
for the agent as
C(etN , e
t
P ) := C(e
t
N , e
t
P ; s) =
1
2
(cN(e
t
N)
2 + cP (e
t
P )
2) + s · etNetP (2.4)
with 0 ≤ s < √cNcP representing the degree of cost substitution between
two actions.8
Finally, I assume a negative exponential utility function for the agent (com-
pare Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991)). Introducing r as the constant risk
aversion of the agent, we can write his utility asU(wt, C(etN , e
t
P )) = − exp[−r(wt−
C(etN , e
t
P ))].
9
Corollary 2.1 The agent’s certainty equivalent compensation is given by
CEt := at + αNNt + αP (Pt −Nt)− C(etN , etP )−
r
2
(α2Nσ
2
N + α
2
PP
2
t−1σ
2
P )
6 This is the most common form of compensation in insurance companies
7 Usually, the amount of fixed salary decreases over time as it is directed at new agents
who naturally lack a strong customer base
8 If s = 0, the two efforts are independent; if s > 0, raising effort on one task raises the
marginal cost of the other task
9 Due to the assumption that both effort types induce costs and rewards at the same
time (i.e., at the end of the current period), we can avoid disturbances from present-
biased preferences (see O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999)) that give stronger relative
weight to the earlier reward as it gets closer
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Proof. I define w0t = E[wt] to be the expected compensation (with the expectation being
subject to ²N and ²P ) the agent receives. Let Π be the risk premium such that the agent
is indifferent between the (risky) compensation wt and the ensured one. Then holds that
E[U(w0t − Π)] = E[U(wt)] (I drop the second argument, i.e., the cost, from the utility
function for the sake of ease of presentation). Using a first-order Taylor approximation of
the utility on the left hand-side of the equation yields: U(w0t − Π) ≈ U(w0t ) − ΠU ′(w0t ).
Similarly, second-order Taylor approximation of the utility on the right hand side gives:
U(wt) ≈ U(w0t )+(wt−w0t )U ′(w0t )+ 12 (wt−w0t )2U ′′(w0t ). Taking the expected value of both
equations and using that U(w0t ), U ′(w0t ), U ′′(w0t ) are not stochastic (i.e., they are invariant
under the application of the expected value) and that thereforeE[wt−w0t ] = 0, yields: Π ≈
−U ′′(w0t )
U ′(w0t )
· E[(wt−w0t )2]2 . WithE[(wt−w0t )2] = E[(αN ²N+αPPt−1²P )2] = α2Nσ2N+α2PP 2t−1σ2P
(using the assumption that ²N and ²P are uncorrelated) and r = −U
′′(w0t )
U ′(w0t )
, we see that
Π ≈ − r2 (α2Nσ2N + α2PP 2t−1σ2P ).
Due to the exponential form of the utility function (i.e., it is strictly monoto-
nously increasing), it suffices to find the maximum of the certainty equiv-
alent defined in Corollary 2.1.
By introducing a (constant) factor δ that is used to discount future earn-
ings, we can now formulate the agent’s maximization problem.
The agent’s problem at the beginning of period t can be written as:
max
(etN ,...,e
T
N ),
(etP ,...,e
T
P )
[
T−t∑
i=0
δiCEt+i
]
(2.5)
s.t.
T−t∑
i=0
δiCEt+i ≥ u¯
where T defines the end of the agents’ planning horizon and u¯ being the
agents’ reservation utility.10
The first step is to examine the one-period case. This means that the agent
maximizes his expected utility based only on the outcomes of the current
10 As the fixed salary is independent of the chosen effort, I assume that the partic-
ipation constraint in equation (2.5) is alwas fulfilled as the principal could set at
accordingly without changing any of the subsequent results
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period. I summarize the optimal effort from the agent’s perspective for
this case in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 In the case of a purely myopic agent, i.e., if T = t the optimal levels
of effort are
etN =
cPαNβN − sαP τPt−1
cNcP − s2
etP =
cNαP τPt−1 − sαNβN
cNcP − s2
Proof. By solving the first order conditions of the agent’s problem from equation (2.5) for
the case T = t for etN and e
t
P and solving the resulting two equation system, the expres-
sions above can easily be derived.
Based on the specification just presented, we can now formulate our main
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.1 The effort spent on selling has a positive effect on the new busi-
ness production (see equation (2.1)).
As similar hypothesis can be stated for the portfolio development:
Hypothesis 2.2 The effort spent on customer care has a positive effect on the
portfolio size (see equation (2.2)).
And thirdly, regarding the ability of the company to influence the alloca-
tion of the agent’s effort across different tasks, we formulate:
Hypothesis 2.3 The agent exerts more effort on selling the higher αN , the lower
αP and the lower the initial portfolio size Pt−1 is. He invests more in customer
care the higher αP , the lower αN and the higher Pt−1 is (see Theorem 2.2).
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These hypotheses are built on the myopic case, I will now turn to the multi-
period version of the agent-problem and discuss how far this extension
affects our above statements.
For the sake of traceability, and to be able to derive a closed-form solution,
I will discuss the case of an agent over two periods. This is, of course,
a limitation to the general case but as the work by Frederick et al. (2002)
has shown, the concept of discounted utility on multiple periods is usu-
ally not supported by empirical data. For insurance agents in particular,
where the overall business is subject to many external factors, it seems to
be reasonable to assume that the planning horizon is limited to a couple
of years. Conceptually, however, the same methods also apply to higher-
period models, although they quickly become computationally very in-
volved.
Rewriting equation (2.5) for the 2-period case gives
max
(etN ,e
t+1
N ),
(etP ,e
t+1
P )
[CEt + δCEt+1] (2.6)
s.t. CEt + δCEt+1 ≥ u¯
Again, I summarize the solution of this 2-period agent’s problem into a
Theorem.
Theorem 2.3 In the case of an agent that optimizes his effort allocation based on
the current and the next period, i.e., if T = t+ 1 the optimal levels of effort are:
etNB(αP , Pt−1) = βNτ
2P 2t−1Kα
3
P
+KPt−1
[
(1− κτ)(cPβN − sτPt−1)− αNβNPt−1τ 2
]
α2P
+
[
δ(sτPt−1 − βNcP )(1− κτ + αNβNsτ
D
)− sτPt−1
]
αP
+ cPαNβN
etPB(αP , Pt−1) =− β2NτPt−1Kα3P
+KPt−1
[
(1− κτ)(cNτPt−1 − sβN)− αNβ2Nτ
]
α2P
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+[
δ(cNτPt−1 − βNs)(1− κτ − αNβNsτ
D
) + cNτPt−1
]
αP
− sαNβN
with K := δ( cN τ
2
D
− rσ2P ), D = cNcP − s2 and the polynomial B(αP , Pt−1) :=
K(2βNsτPt−1 − β2NcP − cNτ 2P 2t−1)α2P + D. For et+1N and et+1P , Theorem 2.2
applies.
Proof. As I assume the agent to behave rationally, we can apply the first order conditions
for (etN , e
t
P ) in (2.6), conditional on (e
t+1
N , e
t+1
P ) being optimal in the sense of Theorem 2.2.
Accounting for the Pt-dependency (and consequentially, the (etN , e
t
P )-dependency) of the
optimal effort at time t+ 1, we obtain the expressions above.
Although the expressions for etN and e
t
P are more complex than those for
the 1-period case seen earlier, there are still some interesting conclusions
we can draw from these results. First, we see that both efforts are linear
in the new business commission rate (we will have a closer look at the
effect-direction of an increase/decrease in the new business commission
rate on the selling effort and the customer care effort later). Second, the
influence of the recurring commission rate is non-linear with a third-order
polynomial in the nominator and a second-order polynomial in the de-
nominator.11 This complex structure makes it difficult to derive analytical
expressions such as the derivative with respect to the recurring commis-
sion rate and we will thus rely on the results we will obtain from the sim-
ulated data in order to make predictions regarding our hypotheses. What
we can see, though, is that the variance of the customer retention activity
σP plays an important role as it determines the magnitude of the variable
K. Furthermore, we can see that Theorem 2.3 reduces to Theorem 2.2 if
δ = 0.
We will now turn to the analysis of the effect from changes in the new
business commission rate.
11 The notation with the polynomial B(αP , Pt−1) being multiplied with the corre-
sponding effort level has been chosen for presentational purposes only
22
Theorem 2.4 The new business commission rate has a linear effect on both the
optimal selling and customer care effort. If B(αP , Pt−1) > 0 and K > 0, the
direction of the effect can be evaluated depending on the recurring commission
rate αP :
∂etN
∂αN
> 0 if αP < φN
∂etP
∂αN
< 0 if αP < φP
with φN =
δPt−1s2−βN cP δs+
√
4cPP
2
t−1D2K+δ2P
2
t−1s4τ2−2βN cP δ2Pt−1s3τ+β2N c2P δ2s2
2P 2t−1τDK
and
φP =
cN δPt−1sτ2−βN δs2τ+
√
4βNPt−1sτD2K+c2N δ2P
2
t−1s2τ4−2βN cN δ2Pt−1s3τ3+β2N δ2s4τ2
2βNPt−1τDK
. If
B(αP , Pt−1) < 0, the effect direction is inverted. For K < 0, the same qualitative
effect direction applies only with different values for φN and φP . The effect of αN
on (et+1N , e
t+1
P ) has already been summarized in Hypothesis 2.3.
Proof. Calculating the first derivatives with respect to αN of the optimal effort levels as
given in Theorem 2.3, we see that if B(αP , Pt−1) > 0, the nominator of
∂etP
∂αN
( ∂e
t
N
∂αN
) is of
(inverse) U-shape in αP . Calculating the roots of the nominator results in expressions
with different signs. Thus, we can conclude that the derivative of etP with respect to αP
is negative as long as αP is smaller than the (positive) root. The same argument can be
used to show the claim for etN .
In other words, the result of Theorem 2.4 indicates that in the 2-period
case, an increase of the new business commission rate has a positive effect
on the sales effort and a negative effect on the customer care effort unless
the recurring commission rate raises beyond a certain critical value. Be-
yond this point, an increase in the new business commission rate leads
to a decrease in the selling effort, resulting in the opposite effect to that
presumably desired. Instead, the effort spent on customer care increases.
Even if αP is still below the critical point, the higher the recurring commis-
sion rate, the smaller the marginal effect of an increase in the new business
commission rate. This result is in line with general intuition, as the agent
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probably feels less willing to spend additional effort on selling if the re-
curring commission rate is comparably high (and thus, the financial loss
of not retaining a customer is quite severe).
2.2.2 Predictions from Simulated Data
As already pointed out above, it is impossible to calculate closed-form so-
lutions for the marginal effect of the recurring commission rate or the last
year’s portfolio on the optimal effort choice of the agent. I will now, there-
fore, discuss the effects of changes in αP and Pt−1, respectively, using sim-
ulated data. It should be noted that the discussion of the 2-period results
based on the simulated data is not meant to be a rigorous proof regarding
the properties of the solution given in Theorem 2.3. Due to the depen-
dency between the optimal effort and the chosen parametrization, some
scenarios (e.g., that the root of the first derivative of the agent’s problem
with respect to etN or e
t
P does not mark a maximum but a minimum) are
not discussed here. Instead, I will focus on those settings that resemble
a ”real-life” scenario, disregarding some theoretical artifacts that may oc-
cur. In Figure 2.2, we see the results of the numerical calculations, i.e.,
the formulas derived above were used to calculate the optimal selling and
customer care effort under different scenarios. In order to calculate these
values, I make some assumptions regarding the input-parameters. The
choice was based on considerations regarding an appropriate relative re-
lation between the parameters, although the overall level is fairly arbitrary
as one could easily scale all parameters up or down without changing the
qualitative, relational shape of the curves. As I assume the effort to be
between 0 and 1, I chose the set of parameters to be close to 1 in order to
maintain a common effect-level. Furthermore, if possible, I also tried to
lean on the data-set I will use in the next section. In particular, I chose
τ = 0.1, κ = 1.1, δ = 0.5, cN = 2, cP = 1, s = 0.5, σ2P = 0.1, βN = 10 and
r = 0.1. Thus, I assume a churn rate of 10%, which the agent can reduce
(assuming a customer care effort of 1) to 1% (i.e., 10% ∗ (1.1 − 1)) due to
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Figure 2.2: Results from simulated data with βN = 10, τ = 0.1, δ = 0.5,
s = 0.5, κ = 1.1, cN = 2, cP = 1, σ2P = 0.1, r = 0.1
the choice of κ = 1.1. I assume that the agent values the expected return
of the next period with one-half. The cost associated with exerting effort
on selling is assumed to be twice as large as the customer care effort (e.g.,
due to required customer visits prior to the signing of a contract and ad-
ministrative one-off costs). The cost substitution factor is set to 0.5 which
is roughly one-third of the maximal, full-substitution value of
√
2. I base
this on the assumption that agents are not always in an ”either/or” situa-
tion regarding how they spend their time but rather have some flexibility
in their daily schedule. The uncertainty regarding the portfolio develop-
ment is set to 10% of the portfolio managed. As unexpected changes in
the portfolio development are rare and small, this value seems reasonable.
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As the variance of the new business production error term is not required
for the calculations, I omit it here. Regarding the scaling factor of the new
business production βN , I try to be close to the data-set I will use in the
next section. As we can see in Table 2.3, the average new business produc-
tion is around EUR 14,000 and the average portfolio size is EUR 75,000. To
keep a similar ratio in the simulated data, I set βN = 10 in all cases and
Pt−1 = 60 in those cases where we analyze the commission rate variations
(see Figures 2.2(b) and 2.2(c)). Also the choice of αN and αP draws on the
field data. In Figure 2.2(a), I set the commission rates to 14% and 7% for the
new business and the recurring commission rate, respectively. In Figures
2.2(b) and 2.2(c), the same values are used for the non-variable commis-
sion rate (i.e., αP = 0.07 in 2.2(b) and αN = 0.14 in 2.2(c)).
As the optimal effort levels given in Theorem 2.2 and 2.3 are not restricted
to values between 0 and 1, I set negative values to zero and values above
one to 1. I will now show that this method (in most cases) leads to the
unique maximum within the interval. As we will need the first order con-
ditions of the agent’s problem that were already implicitly used for the
proofs of Theorem 2.2 and 2.3, I will now explicitly state them here. The
first order conditions for the 1-period case are
etN =
αNβN − setP
cN
(2.7)
etP =
αP τPt−1 − setN
cP
(2.8)
and for the 2-period case
etN =
B1e
t
P + βN(αN + αPB2)
cN − β2NKα2P
(2.9)
etP =
B1eN + τPt−1(αP + αPB2)
cP − τ 2P 2t−1Kα2P
(2.10)
with B1 = βNα2P τPt−1K − s and B2 = (1−κτ)(δ+αPPt−1K)cN cP−s2 .
With these preliminaries at hand, I summarize in Table 2.2.2 the rules on
how to project the different possible effort levels into the interval of al-
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etN
< 0 ∈ [0, 1] > 0
< 0 etN = e
t
P = 0 (2.10) with e
t
N = 0 ≈ etN = 0, etP = 1
etP ∈ [0, 1] (2.9) with etP = 0 Theorem 2.3 (2.9) with etP = 1
> 0 ≈ etN = 1, etP = 0 (2.10) with etN = 1 etN = etP = 1
Table 2.1: Decision rules how to project the calculated optimal effort into
the interval of [0,1] for the 2-period case
lowed values. Although I am interested mainly in the ”inner solutions” of
the agent’s problem, i.e., where Theorem 2.3 applies, I will briefly discuss
why the projection rules as described in Table 2.2.2 lead to the optimal ef-
fort allocation within the given interval. Due to the inverted U-shape with
respect to etN or e
t
P of the agent’s problem, it is clear that if the vertex of
the parable lies outside of [0,1], the maximum within this interval is at-
tained at the boundaries, i.e., at 0 for negative optimal effort values and
at 1 for positive optimal effort values. By setting the effort to values other
than the calculated optimum, the equilibrium effort as given in Theorem
2.3 is no longer attained. Instead, if only one of the two effort values is
set to its boundary value, we can use equation (2.9) or (2.10), respectively,
to calculate the corresponding optimal effort. If both calculated optimal
efforts are above (below) the upper (lower) boundary, setting one of them
to one (zero) increases (decreases) the corresponding other effort level (as
for most parameter constellations, B1 < 0 and the denominators are pos-
itive, there is a negative relation between etN and e
t
P as one would expect
due to the cost substitution between the two tasks. Therefore, decreasing
(increasing) one of the efforts increases (decreases) the other one. Only
in those cases where one value is above the upper and the other is below
the lower boundary, might there be two ”second best” optima, depending
on which of the two values is set to the boundary first (as the decrease
(increase) of one effort could theoretically lead to the other value being
pushed above (below) the boundary). As these nonetheless lie close to-
gether due to the continuous nature of the equations, this does not change
the qualitative direction of the results. The same argument applies to the
1-period case.
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Interpreting Figure 2.2, we start with 2.2(a) where both the selling and the
customer care efforts are shown for the 1- and the 2-period model for dif-
ferent levels of (last periods) portfolio Pt−1. The optimal selling effort in
the 2-period model is higher at the beginning compared to the 1-period
model. This is in line with the expectations as the agent not only receives
the utility of the resulting new business for the current period but also
for the subsequent one. For the same reason, the customer care effort is
also higher. Due to the change of the calculation method for boundary-
solutions, as described above, the resulting graphs are continuous but not
continuously differentiable. In the 2-period case, if the customer care effort
is set to one of the boundaries, the selling effort slightly increases as new
business effort is linearly dependent on the portfolio size if the customer
care effort is held constant (compare equation 2.9). As K > 0, the slope
is positive in these cases. In those cases where we have an inner solution
as given in Theorem 2.3, we see the expected effort substitution as the ex-
pected utility of customer care increases with portfolio size (as the amount
of commission at stake due to potential customer-churn increases).
In Figure 2.2(b), we clearly see the linear dependency between effort and
the new business commission rate. As φN = 3.1 (φP = 1.4), we see from
Theorem 2.4that the slope of the selling (customer care) effort has to be
positive (negative). Again, as expected, the level of effort in the 2-period
case is higher than for 1-period. The marginal effect of an increase in new
business commission rate, however, is quite similar between the two mod-
els.12
Figure 2.2(c) describes the influence of the recurring commission rate on
the agent’s effort. The 1-period case shows the behavior as described in
Hypothesis 2.3. In the 2-period model, however, we observe a positive
relation between αP and the selling effort. This is contrary to the hypothe-
sis derived from the 1-period model. Nevertheless, this result is probably
more in line with the rational behavior one might expect: the higher the
12 Note that in the 1-period case, we observe the scenario of opposed boundary-hitting
described above. As already pointed out, I set the optimal values to be zero and
one, although there might be two different optimum values which oscillate closely
around zero and one
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utility of (the future) portfolio (due to an increase of the recurring commis-
sion rate), the more incentive the agent has to exert effort on selling today
in order to increase the customer base, as it will pay-off later through the
subsequent recurring commissions. Whether, and how strongly, the sell-
ing effort will increase (together with the effort spend on customer care)
clearly depends on the level of cost substitution between the two tasks.
For high values of s, we would expect a negative relation while for low
values of s, the relation should be positive.13
To summarize, as all other results are quite robust to changes in the para-
metrization, we conclude that the hypotheses 2.1-2.3 also hold for the 2-
period case with the exception of the influence of the recurring commis-
sion rate. For the relation between the recurring commission rate and the
selling effort, we can make no clear predictions due to the strong depen-
dency of the effect direction on the parametrization of the model.
I am aware that both the time allocation and the compensation of an agent
are affected by many other external factors such as personal preferences
and ability which I do not cover in the model. I restrict myself to quanti-
tative analyses on the performance and compensation levels based on the
agents’ time split, age and tenure. Thus, I do not draw on the behavioral
or managerial literature on sales-force management for the hypotheses (in
line with Coughlan & Narasimhan (1992)). This approach has been cho-
sen in other works, e.g., in Mohnen & Schmidtlein (2008) where behavioral
aspects such as altruistic behavior or fairness are excluded in order to sim-
plify the model. Nevertheless, some works found certain evidence for the
influence of social incentives and personal preferences (see Bru¨ggen & Mo-
ers (2007), Bonner & Sprinkle (2002), Sprinkle (2000)).
In the next section, I will describe the data-set and test the four hypotheses
using the given sample.
13 This intuition is also substantiated by using an appropriate parametrization of the
simulated data (not shown here)
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2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Data Description
I use a database containing performance and compensation data as well
as additional, survey-based personal information at the agent level for the
year 2005.14 The data was collected from three German insurance compa-
nies. As the data does not contain explicit information on the new busi-
ness and recurring commission rates specified within the contract, I cal-
culate the corresponding commission rate for each agent by dividing the
recurring (new business) commissions by the portfolio (new business pro-
duction) size.
I exclude observations with an unreasonably high or low commission rate
(i.e., all those with a commission rate below 0% or above 40%). Further-
more, I only consider full-time agents, i.e., agents who work more than 20
hours per week, which leaves us with a total of 1,504 observations.
To determine how the agent splits the time between customer care activ-
ities, selling and administrative tasks, I use a question from the survey.
The agent was asked to distribute his time over eight activities such that
the total is 100%. To simplify the analysis, I clustered those eight activities
into the three categories ”selling”, ”customer care” and ”administration”
as shown in Table 2.2.15 Furthermore, the agent was asked to provide the
average number of working hours per week. From this information, I de-
rived the number of hours spent on each task, referred to as ”effort” in this
paper.
An important caveat of the study is that the time split and the working
hours were not asked for individual products. Therefore, I assume that
14 In addition, I also use data on new business and portfolio from 2004 as control vari-
ables
15 See also Table 2.8 for a regression with all tasks. Especially the high correlation of
0.29 between claims and customer advisory indicates that it seems to be reasonable
to combine both tasks. Also, anecdotic evidence suggests that good claims-handling
is often perceived as a strong retention reason for the customer
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Table 2.2: Definition of selling, customer care and administrative tasks
Selling Customer care Administration
• Scheduling and
preparation of
appointments
• Appointments
(incl. travel time)
• Tender preparation
• Advice, customer
care
• Claims manage-
ment
• Trainings, coaching, or-
ganization, leadership
• Office and administra-
tive tasks
the effort is evenly distributed between the products offered.
Table 2.3 gives a basic description of the key variables used in this work.
As outlined above, the most frequently used performance measures in the
insurance industry are new business and portfolio size. Looking at the
average time split and the split of the commission per agent, we find that
almost 80% of the total commission comes from the portfolio (i.e., recur-
ring commission) with only 20% of the time being spent on customer care.
On the other hand, with 60% of the time spent on selling, only 20% of the
total commissions are generated for auto policies. This indicates that the
recurring commissions are almost treated as a ”fixed salary” that needs
minimal if any attention from the agent.
The new business commission rate is quite high, with a mean of 14.3% and
a standard deviation of 6.7. The recurring commission rate on the other
hand is much lower: 7.3% on average, with a standard deviation of 2.6, is
paid to the agents.16 So, although the incentive to focus on new business is
clearly visible, the majority of the money is still earned via the portfolio as
seen above. Means reveal very little about potential causal effects between
the level of the commission rate and the production or the time spent on a
specific task, so I will use a more direct approach to investigate this issue.
Table 2.4 presents some means of the key variables as in Table 2.3 but con-
tains the data for only two groups. One group contains those agents that
16 These values are quite customary in this particular market (see, e.g., Beenken (2003))
with the new business commission rate being slightly above-average
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Table 2.3: Mean and standard deviation of key variables (N=1,504)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.)
Hrs. selling 31.6 (9.0)
Hrs. cust. care 9.4 (5.4)
Hrs. admin 10.0 (6.1)
New business (’000) 13.6 (13.5)
Portfolio (’000) 74.5 (61.0)
Last periods new bus. (’000) 15.2 (14.9)
Last periods portf. (’000) 77.5 (62.6)
New business commission 1,701.2 (1,428.3)
Recurring commission 5,701.2 (5,097.2)
New bus. commission rate 14.3 (6.7)
Rec. commission rate 7.3 (2.6)
Age 44.1 (9.6)
Tenure 11.3 (8.6)
No. employees 1.4 (0.9)
spend an extraordinarily large amount of time selling. The other group
has those agents that similarly focus instead on customer care. By ”ex-
traordinarily”, I mean that the time spent on selling or customer care is
above the mean plus one standard deviation. These means are, therefore,
quite instructive in helping identify some basic features of multi-tasking,
which we investigate in more detail below. We find that agents focusing
mainly on customer care generate new business worth EUR 20,300 whilst
those that focus on selling get only EUR 12,200. One reason for this sur-
prising result may be the difference in tenure between the two groups: The
customer care focused agents have a mean tenure of 14 years compared to
9 years for those that spend most time selling. Thus, one aspect of the
difference in performance may be a simple experience-driven effect that
leads to more efficient and effective selling practice in the customer care
group. Furthermore, due to the lower tenure of the first group, these are
probably mainly agents that have recently started and are therefore still in
the process of building-up their customer base. Thus, they naturally have
to focus on selling as there are only a few existing customers need their
attention. A similar result was also found by Beenken (2003), who states
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Table 2.4: Summary of key variables for agents specialized on selling
(N=235) and customer care (N=249)
Selling Customer care
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Hrs. selling 46.1 (5.3) 28.5 (7.8)
Hrs. cust. care 7.7 (4.8) 18.6 (4.3)
Hrs. admin 7.6 (5.4) 9.8 (5.4)
New business (’000) 12.2 (11.2) 20.3 (21.0)
Portfolio (’000) 61.2 (51.2) 110.7 (83.9)
Last periods new bus. (’000) 14.5 (16.0) 21.2 (19.6)
Last periods portf. (’000) 65.4 (59.4) 111.6 (78.8)
New bus. com. 1,513.8 (1,323.2) 2,388.2 (1,917.8)
Rec. com. 4,529.2 (4,262.6) 8,544.3 (6,623.1)
New bus. com. rate 14.2 (7.1) 14.1 (6.4)
Rec. com. rate 7.0 (3.5) 7.5 (2.1)
Age 43.7 (10.2) 45.5 (8.8)
Tenure 9.1 (7.6) 13.5 (8.3)
No. employees 1.5 (0.9) 1.6 (0.9)
that agents with 500 or more customers are forced to work mainly on cus-
tomer care.
Nevertheless, we do see a slightly higher recurring commission rate for
the group that is more customer care oriented, therefore this could also be
a driver that enforces a retention-based approach.
2.3.2 Effect of Effort Allocation on Performance
With these first indications in mind, I now run an OLS regression17 to test
hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 from Section 2.2. Besides the main explanatory
variables used in the model, I also control for age and tenure to account
for the potential experience-driven effects just mentioned. Furthermore,
I include the number of employees and company effects and use the log-
transformed values for new business and portfolio size for an easier inter-
pretation. The results of the regression are shown in Table 2.5.
17 I always use robust standard errors in this work
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Table 2.5: Influence of effort allocation on (log) new business production
and portfolio development
New bus. New bus. Portf Portf.
Hrs cust. care 0.0371*** 0.0114*** 0.0416*** 0.00725***
(7.41) (3.07) (7.97) (2.71)
Hrs selling 0.000413 0.000635 -0.00543* -0.00247*
(0.14) (0.29) (-1.77) (-1.65)
Hrs admin 0.0239*** 0.0138*** 0.0251*** 0.00914***
(5.63) (4.09) (6.21) (4.22)
Last periods new bus. (’000) 0.0190*** 0.00375***
(9.55) (3.16)
Last periods portf. (’000) 0.00484*** 0.00876***
(10.18) (28.66)
Age -0.0100*** -0.000498
(-4.48) (-0.30)
Tenure 0.00337 0.00831***
(1.23) (4.51)
No. employees -0.132*** -0.182***
(-5.08) (-8.45)
Company effect No Yes No Yes
Observations 1504 1504 1504 1504
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.501 0.078 0.758
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown
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The first two columns contain the regression results with new business,
and the third and fourth columns show portfolio as the dependent vari-
able. We see a positive relation both for customer care and selling time
with new business. This relation gets weaker as we add more control vari-
ables, but is still maintained (with the coefficient for selling time being
small in magnitude and statistical significance). Similarly, there is also a
strong positive relation between customer care time and the size of the
portfolio. An increase in the weekly time spent on customer care by one
hour corresponds to a portfolio increase of approximately 0.7%. For sell-
ing, we see a negative relation of approximately -0.3%.
Overall, we find some evidence for both the first and second hypothesis,
although the support of the relation between selling time and new busi-
ness is small in magnitude and significance.
Regarding the influence of the control variables, we find a strong positive
relationship between the last period’s portfolio and the new business pro-
duction of approximately 5% which might hint at some word-of-mouth
effects as discussed in Section 2.2. The negative effect from age might indi-
cate the influence of fatigue or energy levels that are too low for a sales-job,
while the strong negative coefficient of the number of employees clearly
stems from some commission-sharing agreements with sub-agents.
Furthermore, we also see that the time spent on administration has a pos-
itive, statistically significant effect. One reason for this somewhat surpris-
ing result may be that it also contains some effects from more managerial
tasks that go along with larger agencies, which we do not fully capture via
the tenure variable.
2.3.3 Effect of Incentives on Effort Allocation
We will now turn to the third and last hypothesis: the influencing factors
of the agent’s time allocation. Table 2.6 summarizes the OLS regression
results with the time allocated to customer care and selling, as well as
the total working time as dependent variables. We also included squared
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Table 2.6: Influence of commission rates and last periods portfolio on the
agent’s effort allocation
Hrs selling Hrs cust. care Total hrs
New bus. com. rate 0.255** -0.0169 -0.157
(2.45) (-0.23) (-0.94)
sq(New bus. com. rate) -0.00587** -0.000506 0.00370
(-2.06) (-0.26) (0.80)
Rec. com. rate -0.238 0.248** -0.384
(-1.61) (2.37) (-1.52)
sq(Rec. com. rate) 0.0129*** -0.0113*** 0.00768
(2.62) (-3.31) (0.67)
Total hrs 0.620*** 0.183***
(31.53) (12.00)
Last periods new bus. (’000) -0.0441 -0.0126 0.0804
(-1.33) (-0.47) (1.62)
sq(Last periods new bus.) 0.000761** -0.0000292 -0.000464
(2.32) (-0.09) (-1.09)
Last periods portf. (’000) -0.0488*** 0.0296*** 0.0195
(-4.83) (3.55) (1.29)
sq(Last periods portf.) 0.0000875*** -0.0000217 -0.00000472
(2.87) (-0.77) (-0.11)
Age 0.00296 -0.0156 0.0824***
(0.14) (-1.04) (2.63)
Tenure -0.130*** 0.0432** -0.0398
(-5.07) (2.22) (-1.03)
No. employees -1.139*** 0.423** 1.482***
(-4.78) (2.49) (4.35)
Constant 32.17*** 10.50*** 48.97***
(39.36) (17.40) (42.91)
Observations 1504 1504 1504
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.215 0.040
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Company-effects included
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terms to be in line with the model, so interpreting the coefficients is quite
tedious. Therefore, I interpret only the qualitative results based on the Ta-
ble and discuss the details based on Figure 2.3, which allows for an easier
comparison with the model. Starting with the first column of Table 2.6, we
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Figure 2.3: Predicted effort levels based on regression results from field-
data
find a positive (negative) relation between the new business (recurring)
commission rate and the time spent on selling. Similarly, we have the
same but inverted effect for customer care time, although the coefficients
of the new business commission rate are statistically not significant. The
third column shows that both commission rates have a negative relation-
ship with the total number of working hours. Even though the effect is
statistically not significant, this might be an indicator of a reference-point
dependent preference of the agent (see Fehr & Goette (2007)).
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Interestingly, the number of employees in an agency has a very signifi-
cant effect on the time allocation. This may be explained by the fact that
agents with a large customer base employ sub-agents who carry out the
time-consuming customer-acquisition work, leaving the senior agents to
focus on the relationships with his customer base.
These first impressions are backed up by Figure 2.3. Here, I have used the
corresponding linear and squared coefficients of Table 2.6 to predict the ef-
fort allocation of each agent (with each dot representing one observation).
Comparing these graphs with those in Figure 2.2, we see that in the case of
portfolio and new business commission rate variations (Figures 2.2(a) and
2.3(a) as well as 2.2(c) and 2.3(c)), the shapes are qualitatively the same. In
the case of the recurring commission rate, however, the slope of the curves
resembles the 1-period model for the first part (up to approx αP = 10%)
but then, the effect is inverted, i.e., the amount of time spent on selling
increases, while the customer care time decreases. As we already saw in
Section 2.2, the direction of the effect on selling was quite sensitive to the
chosen specification. This could be one reason for the observed U-shape.
For the customer care effort, the decreasing slope may again indicate some
degree of the reference-point dependency. Due to the limited number of
observations on the right-hand side of the curve, however, the unexpected
slope might also be an artifact driven by outliers.
To summarize, I found clear support of the predicted influence of the last
period’s portfolio and the new business commission rate as outlined in
hypothesis 2.3. Regarding the relation between recurring commission rate
and effort allocation, I find some evidence for the predictions derived from
the 1-period model for small to medium values of αP . For large recurring
commission values, the findings do not support this particular part of hy-
pothesis 2.3.
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2.3.4 Robustness
I will now discuss the robustness of the results under different specifica-
tions. First of all, a test reveals that we can clearly reject the hypothesis of
homoscedastic error terms. I therefore use robust standard errors through-
out this work. The use of log-transformed new business and portfolio val-
ues should further reduce this problem.
As already pointed out in Section 2.3.1, I had to use an estimation of the
commission rates to perform the analyses. Running a correlation analy-
sis, we see a high correlation of 0.82 /0.95) for new business production
compared to new business commissions (portfolio and recurring commis-
sions). The lower correlation in the former may be due to the fact that the
new business data is net of churn, i.e., in case of mid-term cancelations, the
new business figures are already reduced by this amount. The new busi-
ness commission, though, is not necessarily corrected for churn. Thus, the
commission rates I calculate may not fully represent the true commission
rates as they were agreed in the agent’s contract. Nonetheless, the high
correlation values indicate that the approximation is reasonable.
Another critical question is the validity of the task-clustering as shown in
Table 2.2. Running a correlation analysis supports this clustering. Fur-
thermore, performing the same analyses with the full set of tasks gives
comparable results to the clustered case (see Table 2.8).
One could question the overall relationship between incentives and per-
formance (see Camerer et al. (1997) and Section 2.1 for more details). In
fact, running a regression of new business production and portfolio size
on the commission rates, we also get mixed results as can be seen in Ta-
ble 2.7. In a simple specification, the relation between both new business
and recurring commission rate with new business production and port-
folio is positive (see columns (1) and (3)). Adding further control vari-
ables, however, leads to a negative relation of both commission rates with
new business (whereas the relation with the portfolio remains positive).
This surprising result should probably be attributed to the approximation
of the new business commission rate as discussed above. Specifically, as
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there may be cases in which the new business figures are corrected for
churn whereas the commissions paid are not, we could have a bias to-
wards higher commission rates. This would, in turn, correspond to com-
parably lower new business values, thus explaining the result in Table 2.7.
This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results regarding new
business.
Finally, the time-allocation I use here is not product-specific. Thus, to un-
derstand better the effect of the commission rates on the effort direction,
I included also the property & casuality commission rates as independent
variables. The results (see Table 2.9) are almost the same as in Table 2.6
so that we can suppose the effects we measure are not just artifacts from
other commission rates that were omitted.
Overall, we find that the results presented in the previous section are
rather robust under different specifications.
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2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, I analyzed the relation between incentives, effort allocation
and performance using the example of insurance tied agents.
First, I set up the mathematical model and derived three hypotheses re-
garding the expected effects of variations in the effort allocation and in-
centives. Second, I used a data-set of German insurance agents to test the
hypotheses.
I found that time spent on customer care has a positive effect both on the
auto portfolio and new business production. Surprisingly, though, I did
not find a statistically significant effect of the selling-time on new business.
Regarding the influence of the new business commission rate on the agent’s
time allocation, the results are in line with the model, i.e., there should be
a positive (negative) relation with the selling (customer care) time. In the
case of the recurring commission rate, however, I obtained mixed results,
suggesting that for low to medium rates, the effect is in line with the pre-
dictions (i.e., positive on customer care, negative on selling) whereas for
high rates, the effect is inverted.
Finally, regarding the influence of the last period’s portfolio on the effort
allocation, I again find support for the hypothesis that it is positive for cus-
tomer care and negative for selling.
To further refine the results, a next step would be to test the results with
product-specific effort-levels. As I use data from general insurance com-
panies, this data was not available. Therefore, future research could focus
on, e.g., monoline insurance companies to avoid cross-product interde-
pendencies.
The main contribution of this work is two-fold. Firstly, by developing
a 2-period model that accounts for portfolio effects, I present a theoreti-
cal framework that captures many of the influencing factors in the con-
text of insurance tied agents. The limitation to two periods might actu-
ally be a more appropriate approach than the general multi-period set-
ting (compare Frederick et al. (2002)). The closed-form solution presented
may therefore be used as a starting-point for further research regarding
41
the optimal time-allocation also from the principal’s point of view (which
I excluded in this work as I purely focused on the agent). Secondly, by
using a large data-set, I added another piece of empirical evidence to the
discussion regarding the influence of incentives. I was able to show that
there is indeed a relation between incentives, effort allocation and perfor-
mance, indicating that a thorough choice of an appropriate incentive level
is crucial to steer the sales force in the desired direction.
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2.5 Appendix to Chapter 2
Table 2.7: Direct influence of commission rates on (log) new business and
portfolio
New bus. New bus. Portf. Portf.
New bus. com. rate 0.00971 -0.0324** 0.0990*** 0.0419***
(0.53) (-2.19) (5.09) (3.21)
sq(New bus. com. rate) -0.00142*** -0.000334 -0.00257*** -0.00115***
(-3.17) (-0.91) (-5.05) (-3.43)
Rec. com. rate 0.102** -0.0357 0.286*** 0.0966***
(2.38) (-1.13) (5.88) (3.40)
sq(Rec. com. rate) -0.00564** -0.000576 -0.0121*** -0.00530***
(-2.18) (-0.39) (-3.89) (-3.69)
Age -0.00698*** -0.00314
(-2.69) (-1.37)
Tenure 0.0275*** 0.0333***
(8.77) (11.94)
No. employees -0.186*** -0.231***
(-6.03) (-9.06)
Company effect No Yes No Yes
Observations 1504 1504 1504 1504
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.319 0.194 0.509
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown
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Table 2.8: Influence of effort allocation on (log) portfolio and new business
using the detailed tasks for customer care
New bus. New bus. Portf. Portf.
Hrs. preparation -0.0323*** -0.0182** -0.0355*** -0.0112**
(-3.09) (-2.56) (-3.44) (-2.22)
Hrs. appointment 0.00372 0.00217 -0.00112 -0.000861
(1.03) (0.82) (-0.30) (-0.46)
Hrs. tender prep. -0.00487 0.00197 -0.0145 -0.00405
(-0.48) (0.29) (-1.31) (-0.77)
Hrs. service 0.0352*** 0.00869 0.0429*** 0.00794**
(4.73) (1.62) (5.50) (2.14)
Hrs. claims 0.0565*** 0.0246** 0.0567*** 0.0133
(3.56) (2.31) (3.10) (1.57)
Hrs. training -0.000715 -0.00335 0.0159 -0.00324
(-0.04) (-0.27) (0.84) (-0.31)
Hrs. office tasks 0.0251*** 0.0125*** 0.0292*** 0.00912***
(5.04) (3.14) (6.04) (3.60)
Last periods new bus. (’000) 0.0201*** 0.00442***
(9.32) (3.27)
Last periods portf. (’000) 0.00466*** 0.00873***
(8.90) (25.52)
Age -0.00963*** -0.000511
(-4.10) (-0.29)
Tenure 0.00295 0.00920***
(0.95) (4.21)
No. employees -0.160*** -0.198***
(-5.49) (-8.23)
Company effect No Yes No Yes
Observations 1316 1316 1316 1316
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.506 0.088 0.757
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown
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Table 2.9: Influence of commission rates and last periods portfolio on
the agent’s effort allocation, including property and casuality commission
rates
Hrs selling Hrs cust. care Total hrs
New bus. com. rate 0.237** -0.0108 -0.155
(2.25) (-0.14) (-0.93)
sq(New bus. com. rate) -0.00558* -0.000639 0.00365
(-1.95) (-0.32) (0.78)
Rec. com. rate -0.108 0.230** -0.294
(-0.69) (2.11) (-1.15)
sq(Rec. com. rate) 0.00995* -0.0107*** 0.00644
(1.96) (-3.19) (0.57)
dmN ratio S 0.000135 0.000315 -0.00639**
(0.07) (0.17) (-2.31)
dmN ratio S2 1.52e-08 -2.40e-11 -0.000000480***
(0.11) (-0.00) (-2.65)
dmB ratio S -0.411*** 0.0807 -0.246
(-2.96) (0.78) (-1.24)
dmB ratio S2 0.00555*** -0.00116 0.00370
(2.74) (-0.79) (1.25)
Total hrs 0.618*** 0.183***
(31.23) (11.86)
Last periods new bus. (’000) -0.0408 -0.0142 0.0758
(-1.22) (-0.53) (1.52)
sq(Last periods new bus.) 0.000738** -0.0000155 -0.000430
(2.22) (-0.05) (-1.02)
Last periods portf. (’000) -0.0440*** 0.0287*** 0.0208
(-4.34) (3.41) (1.37)
sq(Last periods portf.) 0.0000775** -0.0000195 -0.00000559
(2.55) (-0.69) (-0.13)
Age 0.00748 -0.0160 0.0850***
(0.36) (-1.06) (2.73)
Tenure -0.115*** 0.0388* -0.0280
(-4.37) (1.93) (-0.71)
No. employees -1.068*** 0.442** 1.580***
(-4.31) (2.52) (4.56)
Constant 32.27*** 10.48*** 48.37***
(37.46) (16.55) (40.84)
Observations 1501 1501 1501
Adjusted R2 0.475 0.214 0.042
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Company-effects included
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Tenure, Industry-
and General-Experience on
Compensation
3.1 Introduction
Many studies have tried to understand and explain the effect of tenure,
industry-, and general labor-market experience on the wage development
of employees. One of the best-known theories regarding the relation be-
tween experience and wage is the human capital theory. This states that
additional years of work experience increase the general human capital,
which makes the employee more valuable, and thus lead to higher wages
in all jobs. This implies that employees’ performance improves over time.
Unfortunately, as past empirical research has shown, the link between pay
and performance is rather weak. The main advantage of this work com-
pared to previous research is that it uses a data-set containing informa-
tion on German insurance agents whose compensation is mainly based on
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commission.18 Thus, I can circumvent the issue of both a clear link be-
tween pay and performance and the required voluntariness of the effort
exerted (see Goette et al. (2004)). In this way, I also avoid disturbances of
the experience-performance curve that can arise if earnings are measured
instead (e.g., due to cost of training associated with the build-up of skills
within a firm, see Hashimoto (1981)). Furthermore, as the works by Parent
(2009) and Lemieux et al. (2009) show, the prospect of ”commission pay”
enhances the quality of the worker-firm match, i.e., it induces a certain se-
lection effect that pulls more productive workers into these kinds of jobs.
As a consequence, we can at least assume that the variation in worker-
specific heterogeneity is smaller compared to a set of employees with very
different kinds of jobs.
I will now give a brief overview of the literature concerning experience
and pay. Marshall & Zarkin (1987), Altonji & Shakotko (1987), Abraham
& Farber (1987) and Williams (1991) were the first to question the human
capital theory. They argued that the effect of experience on the current job
is biased because other relevant variables are omitted in the OLS regres-
sions used. They claim that the tenure variable is not exogenous but rather
correlated with the error term in the regression. The rationale behind this
is that the error term contains the effects of ability and other personal pref-
erences of the employee that can not be controlled for. By introducing the
concept of a match variable to account for the goodness-of-fit between the
employee and his current job, they capture all the potential effects that
could be related with tenure in one construct. By assuming that tenure
is correlated with this matching variable (which seems quite reasonable,
as employees that match well with their job also tend to stay longer with
their employer, thus leading to higher tenure), it is obvious that a simple
OLS regression would deliver a biased estimate of the tenure-variable as
it would also include those effects from the matching variable.
Altonji & Shakotko (1987) show that this bias can be quite substantial and
they provide an instrumental-variable (IV) approach to circumvent these
18 As shown by MacLeod & Parent (1999), this payment method is characteristic for
basically all sales workers (they analyzed NLSY data from 1988-90)
47
issues (see Section 3.2 for further details). Based on their work, others
picked-up on this issue and a variety of extensions were developed (e.g.,
Lillard (1999) by modeling the wage dynamics within and between jobs,
and testing for exogeneity of job number and tenure in the wage equation,
or Parent (2000) by distinguishing between job- and industry-match).
Topel (1991) suggested a different, two-stage approach to reduce the bias
from endogeneity of the tenure variable, and finds a rather large return
of 25% for 10 years of tenure with a firm. Reassessments in recent years,
however, provided evidence that the instrumental variable approach gives
more reliable results (see, e.g., Altonji & Williams (2005)).
The question of the influence of job- and industry-match has been widely
discussed. Ruhm (1990) found that the differences in match-quality ap-
pear to be less important, but the more recent publications by Kim (1998),
Parent (2000), Dustmann & Meghir (2005) and Woodcock (2008) all empha-
sized the importance of match-specific effects on the wage determination
of the employee, so this concept is now well established.
Of course, other influencing factors have also been discussed. In Topel
(1991), Topel & Ward (1992) and Dustmann & Pereira (2005), the impor-
tance of job mobility on wage growth is discussed, suggesting that many
job changes are due to the prospect of receiving higher wages with the new
employer. Another reason for the link between tenure and wage growth
may be due to firm-specific human capital that is built up by the employer
through on-the-job-training. The paper by Barth (1997), however, shows
no support for this theory as they find that higher levels of firm specific
training requirements are associated with less steep wage-tenure profiles.
Another factor is analyzed in the work of Bronars & Famulari (1997) who
find that education, experience and tenure are highly correlated within a
company. They conclude that employees at high wage-growth firms tend
to have longer tenure.
The majority of the literature has focused on inter-industry effects, i.e.,
it has analyzed data-sets that captured all industries of one or multiple
countries. Examples are Abraham & Farber (1987) (PSID19: US), Kletzer
19 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
48
(1989) (CPS20: US), Ruhm (1990) (PSID: US), Topel (1991) (PSID: US), Topel
& Ward (1992) (LEED21: US), Neal (1995) (DWS22: US), Kletzer (1996) (CPS:
US), Margolis (1996) (DAS23: France), Kim (1998) (DWS: US), Parent (2000)
(NLSY24, PSID: US), Burda & Mertens (2001) (GSOEP25: Germany), Haynes
et al. (2002) (NESPD26: UK), Huang (2003) (TWFS27: Taiwan), Chuang &
Lee (2004) (MPUS28: Taiwan), Munasinghe & Sigman (2004) (NLSY: US),
Dustmann & Pereira (2005) (GSOEP: Germany, BHPS29: UK).
In these studies, information on (forced) job-displacement was usually
used to estimate an effect of past (industry-specific) experience on the fu-
ture wage either within the same or a different industry.30 Neal (1995) and
Parent (2000) report that the industry-specific experience plays an impor-
tant role in determining the employee’s wage. On the other hand, Klet-
zer (1996) finds that the effect depends on the industry under considera-
tion. In Haynes et al. (2002), and more recently Kambourov & Manovskii
(2009), occupational-specific experience is reported to be more important
than industry-specific experience. Gibbons & Waldman (2006) even pro-
posed that a main driver of performance is task-specific human capital.
Similarly, the recent work by Poletaev & Robinson (2008) suggests that
human capital is not narrowly specific to either industries or occupations,
but rather to a limited number of basic skills.31
As the differences between industry-, occupation-, and task-specific hu-
man capital might be very sensitive to changes in terminology and spec-
ification, this study focuses on one task/occupation (the tied sales agent)
20 Current Population Survey
21 Longitudinal Employee-Employer Data
22 Displaced Worker Survey
23 De´claration Annuelles de Salaire
24 National Longitudinal Survey
25 German Socio-Economic Panel
26 New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset
27 Taiwan Women and Family Survey
28 Manpower Utilization Surveys
29 British Household Panel Survey
30 Oyer (2004) discusses potential issues regarding the reliability of reported pre-
displacement wages in the DWS
31 A related approach was proposed even earlier by Lazear (2003) who suggests, that
the importance of prior experience varies with how firms weight certain skills
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in one specific industry (German insurance).
Many of the empirical studies referenced here were based on large pan-
els (e.g., the PSID). As outlined by Brown & Light (1992), the effect from
job changes in particular seems to be very sensitive to the specification of
the analysis. One of the general limitations when using this or compara-
ble data sets is that they cover a broad range of very different jobs and
industries. This of course helps to uncover the overarching mechanics of
experience and wage, but provides no conclusions for individual indus-
tries or job profiles.
As already pointed out, the results from the more overarching inter-indus-
try analyses (see Kletzer (1996)) showed that the observed effects depend
heavily on the industry being considered. Surprisingly, though, very few
works have tried to narrow the scope of analysis to a specific industry or
sector (see also Baker et al. (1994a)).
One of the few job-specific analyses stems from Coughlan & Narasimhan
(1992). Here, only employees identified as part of the sales force were used
to investigate compensation plans. The study covers 286 firms across 39
industries, but narrows the focus of the research to a specific job profile.
They find that a one-year increase in the average number of years of ser-
vice in the sales force is associated with a USD 300 pay increase when
controlling for industry pay. In other specifications, however, this tenure
effect becomes statistically insignificant.
Another, even more specific analysis was presented by Bratsberg et al.
(2003) who investigated the effect of seniority on the pay of academic re-
searchers. They found a negative relationship and report that the effect is
even stronger when controlling for match-quality. The work by Huckman
& Pisano (2003), on the other hand, reports a positive effect between se-
niority and performance of surgeons in a hospital. No relation, though, is
found between prior experience and performance.
The works by Medoff & Abraham (1980) and Medoff & Abraham (1981),
based on three manufacturing companies, found that the increase in wage
with seniority cannot be explained by an increase in productivity. Simi-
larly, the more recent work by Flabbi & Ichino (2001) reproduced the re-
50
sults at a large Italian bank. Again, they find that the observed effect of
seniority on wage is not reflected in a higher level of productivity (except
at the lowest hierarchy-levels) and thus that the observed positive relation
between seniority and wages must be due to other reasons (e.g., deferred
incentives or insurance).
In the work by Baker et al. (1994b), the wage policy of a single firm32 is
analyzed over a period of 20 years. Again, they find no clear evidence for
a single theory to explain the wage variation within and across hierarchy-
levels in the firm. Overall, we see that there is a lack of industry-specific
empirical evidence for the relation between experience and wage.
With this work, I will contribute to the research on the field of pay and
experience in three different ways.
First, by using a data-set containing information on insurance agents that
are primarily compensated via commissions, I am in the rare position to
test the pure economic effects in the spirit of Goette et al. (2004) (see also
Chapter 1). Furthermore, by focusing on one industry, I add another case-
example to the scarce literature of industry-specific wage and employer-
employee matched analysis (see Lazear & Oyer (2004)).
Second, I contribute to the literature not only by modeling an averaged
influence of the two distinct experience measures but also by providing
the effects for discrete levels of prior experience, revealing a more accu-
rate shape compared to studies where only quadratic/cubic representa-
tions are given. In addition, I distinguish different forms of compensation
of the agent (i.e., new business and recurring commissions, bonification
and salary/subsidies) and therefore provide further insights into the dif-
ferences of compensation components.
Third, I distinguish the effects from prior (non-)agent work experience for
different tenure levels. As we have seen, this approach leads to interesting
results, and is in line with the intuitive notion that skills gained on previ-
ous jobs are especially beneficial at the start of a new job, with the effect
wearing off some years into the new role.
Quite naturally, the insurance company has an interest to motivate the
32 The industry was not disclosed for confidentiality purposes
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agent both to produce new business and to exert a sufficient effort in
customer care in order to increase the likelihood of retaining customers.
Therefore, one of the very specific questions in this industry is whether
the agents can increase their new business production (and, therefore,
new business commissions) while gaining additional experience (see In-
graham (1973)). Thus, when analyzing the effect of tenure and experience
on agents’ compensation, both the total compensation should be consid-
ered as well as the part generated by new customers. Ingraham (1973)
finds a mixed answer to this question by stating that production seems to
plateau after the third calendar year under contract. A similar finding is
also presented by Dorfman (1976) who states that an agent should be able
to increase the amount of new business as the agent’s skill, knowledge,
reputation, average policy-size and referred leads increases. The rate of
growth will decrease as the agent reaches the limits of effort he is willing
to make.
Finally, also the recent publication by Vogler (2009) provides some evi-
dence that the number of years worked as insurance agent has a positive
effect on sales success. In contrast to my work, he operationalizes work
experience only using different job types but not the actual length of work
experience. In addition, he summarizes all agent-related work experience,
without distinguishing between tenure and industry-experience. There-
fore, even though based on the same data-set, the analysis presented here
goes beyond the scope of his publication.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
I develop the model and discuss the application of the IV estimator. In
Section 3.3, I briefly describe the data-set used to test the experience ef-
fects before presenting the outcomes of the IV estimation and discussing
the robustness of the results. In the last section, I summarize the findings
and discuss their implications.
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3.2 The Model
Many different models to describe the relationship between wage and ex-
perience have been developed and proposed in the past. I will base this
work on the model suggested by Parent (2000) in which he introduces a
new variable called industry-specific experience. This variable measures
the amount of time a person has spent in the industry in which he is cur-
rently employed. He concludes that industry-specific skills play a larger
role than firm-specific skills in the wage growth process. One aspect, how-
ever, that is not part of his study, is whether the measured effect really is
an industry- or rather an occupation-effect. This is because the two are
usually closely related. As I focus only on experience that has been gath-
ered as an insurance agent, I can ensure that I measure only the effect from
both the same industry and occupation. This makes the interpretation of
the results even more clear-cut.
As a starting point, I adopt the model by Parent (2000) and consider the
following log wage equation:33
ln(Wit) =β0OJit + β1Tit + β2Expit + β3Expindit
+ αi + θi + γi + ²it
(3.1)
where Wit represents the compensation of agent i in year t. T is tenure,
Expind is the experience of the agent collected when working as tied agent
for a different insurance company and Exp is the general labor market ex-
perience excluding both the current job and any previous jobs as a tied
agent. Furthermore, I include the dummy variable OJit (for old job) of
1 for agents with a tenure larger or equal to one (see Altonji & Shakotko
(1987), Parent (2000)) to capture the particularly strong increase in com-
pensation within the first year of employment. All other independent
variables, including higher order terms of tenure and experience, port-
folio, year and company effects will be included in the regression, but are
33 As I consider only agents working in the insurance industry, I drop the job- and
industry-indices compared to the work by Parent (2000)
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omitted here for the ease of presentation.
In addition to the explanatory variables, I also include four different er-
ror terms. Besides the general error term ²it that captures the unobserved
heterogeneity, I separate αi to capture the person-specific effects (e.g., abil-
ity), θi that corresponds to the job-match effects (i.e., how well the agent
performs in this specific job-employer constellation) and γi which contains
those effects that are related to the industry-match of the agent (i.e., how
well the agent performs as insurance tied agent per se).
As already seen in Section 3.1, the concept of such a matching variable has
been widely discussed. As pointed out by Lazear & Oyer (2007), the im-
portance of the match-effects mainly arises from the heterogeneity of labor
in the firm’s production function. They conclude that matching the right
firm to the right worker creates enormous economic value.34
One of the main reasons to split the error term in such a way is to identify
those aspects that potentially correlate with the explanatory variables in
the regression using equation (3.1). The problem arising from this poten-
tial endogeneity is best discussed by using the form
αi = a1Tit + a2Expit + a3Expindit + ξ
α
it (3.2)
θi = b1Tit + b2Expit + b3Expindit + ξ
θ
it (3.3)
γi = c1Tit + c2Expit + c3Expindit + ξ
γ
it (3.4)
which says that both the job- and the industry-match effects can depend
on tenure, general labor market experience and industry-specific experi-
ence.
When estimating equation (3.1) using OLS and considering the relation-
ships described in equations (3.2)-(3.4), the estimator would produce re-
sults with βOLS1 = β1 + a1 + b1 + c1, βOLS2 = β2 + a2 + b2 + c2 and βOLS3 =
34 The findings by Neal (1999) suggest, that employees use a two-stage approach to
find their optimal job. They first look for their most suitable career (i.e., indus-
try/occupation) and then for the best-matched employer. Similar findings are re-
ported by Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2007). Regarding the second-stage of job search,
Altonji & Paxson (1986) find that there is a match between the number of working
hours the employee is willing to invested and the job chosen
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β3 + a3 + b3 + c3 for the partial effects of the three different experience
types. As pointed out in Dustmann & Pereira (2005), the sign of the bias
can be assessed under certain constraints but is generally ambiguous. If
the coefficients ai, bi or ci are not zero (see Section 3.3.4 for a discussion
of endogeneity tests and robustness) the most common solution is to use
instrumental variables.
The basic idea of instrumental variables is to predict the value of the (po-
tentially) endogenous explanatory variable with a set of instruments and
use these predicted values as regressors in the original model (instead of
the endogenous ones).
More precisely, if we have N observations and k explanatory variables, we
define X ∈ RN×k to be the matrix of all explanatory variables in equation
(3.1) and u ∈ RN×1 the vector of all error terms (where I lump-summed
all four different error components into a single one for the ease of presen-
tation), we can define a new matrix Z ∈ RN×k in which the endogenous
variable Tit is being replaced by an instrument zit. There are two proper-
ties this instrument has to satisfy in order to derive consistent estimates.
First, it must be highly correlated with the endogenous variable but must
be uncorrelated with with the error term. If we have found such an instru-
ment, we can write (see also Baum (2006)):
y = Xβ + u
⇔ Z′y = Z′Xβ + Z′u ≈ Z′XβˆIV
⇔ βˆIV = (Z′X)−1Z′y
where Z is unrelated to u (following from the assumption that z is un-
correlated with the error term and, as it substitutes the only endogenous
variable, that the whole matrix is uncorrelated) and therefore (Z′u)/N → 0
as N becomes large.
The second required property of the instrument is a high correlation be-
tween instrument and endogenous variable. This ensures that the result-
ing estimate βˆIVT of the corresponding variable T has a small standard er-
ror. The asymptotic variance of βˆIVT can be calculated as σ
2/(Nσ2Tρ
2
T,z) with
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σ2 = E(u′u|z), σ2T the variance of T and ρ2T,z the square of the correlation
between T and z (see Wooldridge (2006)). From this, we see that weak
correlation between the endogenous variable and its instrument leads to a
high variance and thus a large standard error.
The most commonly used instrument for the case under consideration in
this paper is the one proposed by Altonji & Shakotko (1987) and I will also
adopt their approach here. I compute T˜it = Tit − Ti, (˜T 2it) = T 2it − T 2i and
O˜Jit = OJit−OJi with Xi being the average of variable X of person i over
the whole period consisting of H years. I then use T˜it, (˜T 2it) and O˜Jit to-
gether with the other explanatory variables as instrumental variables for
Tit, T 2it and OJit. As the sum of each of these instruments is zero over the
sample years and the individual-specific, the job and the industry error
terms αi, θi and γi are constant over all H years, we find that for each
person i:
∑H
t=1(αi+ θi+ γi)T˜it = (αi+ θi+ γi)
∑H
t=1 T˜it = 0, thus the instru-
ment is orthogonal to these three errors by construction. In addition, by
assumption, the instrument is also supposed to be uncorrelated with the
remaining unobserved heterogeneity ²it. Overall, we can conclude that the
instrument is valid under the above assumptions.
With this methodology, we have taken care of the potential bias stemming
from the endogeneity of the tenure variable and its higher order terms.
Unfortunately, the problem with the unobserved matching variables still
remains. In the past, this was usually solved by introducing appropri-
ate instrumental variables (see, e.g., Parent (2000)). These approaches,
though, all rely on the diversity of industries and past job-changes to de-
rive the different instruments. As I focus on only one industry and one
job, these methods would produce perfectly collinear instruments to the
ones constructed above, and are therefore of no use.
Instead, I solve this problem by directly introducing a proxy variable for
job- and industry-match, i.e., instead of equation (3.1), we estimate:
ln(Wit) =β1Tit + β2Expit + β3Expindit
+ β4Matchjobi + β5Matchindi + αi + ²it
(3.5)
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with the two new explanatory variables Matchjob and Matchind corre-
sponding to the job- and industry-match-quality, respectively. Together
with the IV-approach described above, we have now captured all the sources
of potential bias as described in equations (3.2)-(3.4) and therefore, expect
consistent estimates of the different experience effects.
With the design of the compensation system of tied agents in mind (as de-
scribed in Chapter 1), we can already suppose that the effect on tenure in
the data will be large and positive as the portfolio develops with tenure
in a firm and thus also the (log) wage of the agent will increase accord-
ingly. The question of interest in this study will therefore be mainly on the
effect of the two different kinds of prior work experience (tied agent expe-
rience and non-tied agent experience) on the agent’s wage. Furthermore,
we will investigate if and how tenure influences the rate of increase, i.e., if
the predictions by Ingraham (1973) and Dorfman (1976) that the increase
will eventually plateau are correct.
Besides analyzing the overall effect of the experience, we will also investi-
gate how far the potential (dis-)advantage of prior labor market experience
of either type may change depending on the tenure of the agent. For this
purpose, I will include interaction terms of tenure with (non-) tied agent
work-experience. This important aspect is usually not analyzed (see, e.g.,
Parent (2000) who includes only the pure effects as explanatory variables),
although it is very instructive in providing further insights into the influ-
ence of experience.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Data Description
For this analysis, I use a subset of the original data-set containing compen-
sation information for agents for the years 2003 to 2005. The data stems
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from six German insurance companies with a total of 6,890 observations
over this period. I considered only those agents with a tenure below 40
years and total prior experience of less than or equal to 30 years.35 As
only those agents that were employed in 2005 are captured, the data-set is
unbalanced and contains 2,838 agents in 2005, 2,314 in 2004 and 1,738 in
2003 (see also Tables 3.4 - 3.6). As data on the sub-categories of compen-
sation was not available for all companies in all years, the actual number
of observations may vary in those analyses where I looked into those sub-
components. This is also the reason why the means presented in Table 3.1
do not perfectly add up. To control for company- and year-specific effects,
I include corresponding indicator variables in this analysis.
A basic description of the key variables used in this analysis appears in
Table 3.1. All wage-related numbers are measured as yearly income.36
We see that the average total income is about EUR 53,000. Agents’ main
source of income is commission for new contracts and for customer reten-
tion. They earn approx. EUR 52,000 in commissions, 59% of which comes
from new business commissions. Regarding bonification, we see an aver-
age of EUR 4,200, but we have to consider that this is the average over all
agents whereas one can suppose that only some agents will achieve their
full goals and therefore receive even higher bonification. Similarly, the
amount of EUR 5,600 we observe as a mean of salary/subsidies may be
higher for those agents that receive the payments with others receiving al-
most nothing. To account for differences in the way agents are subsidized
in the first years, I include dummy variables for different levels of initial
portfolio.37
The average tenure in the sample is 10.6 years with a prior experience as an
insurance tied agent of 2.0 years. This is quite low compared to the mean
35 This restriction ensures that the sample-sizes in the analyzes where I introduce
experience-clusters are not getting too small, as this would lead to extreme bias from
outliers
36 This way, we avoid disturbances from intra-year-effects (e.g., due to deferred con-
tracts to reach certain quotas) as described by Oyer (1998)
37 Instead of paying subsidies, some insurers provide the agent with a certain number
of existing customers (e.g., the customer base from a retired agent), which results in
recurring commissions serving as subsidies
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of prior work experience excluding any tied agent-related work, which is
11.0 years on average. Furthermore, we see that 90% of the agents have
worked at least one year with their current employer.
The corresponding figures for the each year can be found in the Appendix
(see Tables 3.4 - 3.6). The higher levels of new business commissions in the
years 2003 and 2004 have to be attributed mainly to the increased demand
for life insurance products in these years due to a change in regulation by
the German government.
The figures for prior experience as insurance agent, other prior work ex-
perience, initial portfolio and job- and industry match are derived from
a questionnaire the agents voluntarily filled-in. The value for general la-
bor market experience, though, was not explicitly asked for. Instead, I use
a proxy to construct a numerical value (in years) for this variable. De-
pending on the highest degree of education of the agent (given from the
questionnaire), I assume a fixed starting age into the labor market. The
following choices were available with the corresponding assumed start-
age given in parentheses: middle school (17), high school (20), appren-
ticeship (20), university degree (26). The total work-experience is thus
simply the current age minus the labor-market start age. From this total
work-experience, we can derive the non-agent experience by subtracting
the current tenure and the agent experience.38 From the assumed job-start
age, it is also straight-forward to calculate the total years of education per
agent which is approx. 13 years in the sample. In order to model the job-
and industry-match variables as outlined in Section 3.2, I use two more
items from the questionnaire. As a proxy for job-match, I use the answer
to the question ”How satisfied are you overall with <Company name>?”.39 For
industry-match, I use the answers to ”Would you recommend a friend or col-
38 In those cases where the resulting non-agent experience happened to be between
-5 and 0, I assume that it is due to deviations from the job starting age and set the
experience to zero. In the cases where the difference was below -5, I set the ex-
perience to be missing as the large difference implies that there is some potential
mis-classification in the data
39 translated from the German question ”Wie zufrieden sind Sie insgesamt mit
<Firmenname>?”
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Table 3.1: Mean and standard deviation of key variables (2003-2005)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Total commission 53,062.4 (38,258.5) 6,890
Total new business commission 30,596.6 (22,571.2) 4,523
Total recurring commission 21,240.6 (15,823.9) 5,525
Bonification 4195.6 (4,824.1) 3,179
Fix salary/subsidies 5,613.8 (5,592.4) 4,014
Tenure 10.6 (8.2) 6,890
Prior agent labor experience 2.0 (4.1) 6,890
Non-agent labor experience 11.0 (7.2) 6,890
OJ 0.9 (0.2) 6,890
Years of education 12.9 (2.9) 6,890
Job-match 3.4 (0.9) 6,890
Industry-match 3.0 (1.2) 6,890
league to work as insurance agent?”.40 In both cases, the answer could be
given on a Lickert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). The
correlation between the two variables is 0.35. This value is rather high but
reflects the intuition that job- and industry-match cannot be fully disen-
tangled. To improve this proxy, I use another item from the questionnaire:
information on satisfaction with pay. By regressing overall satisfaction
on pay-satisfaction (using bootstrapping), calculating the predicted val-
ues and using the residuals instead of the initial total satisfaction variable,
I excluded the effect from compensation and thus a potential source of
endogeneity in the regression. The correlation between the two match-
variables is now 0.30. The sample averages of job- and industry-match are
3.441 and 3.0, respectively.
It should be noted that as the questionnaire was filled-in only once (early
2006), the job- and industry-match variables are time-invariant in this anal-
ysis. Although not optimal, in the light of the variables regarding previous
experience (Exp and Expind) also being time-invariant, it seems reason-
40 translated from the German question ”Wu¨rden Sie einem Freund oder Kollegen
empfehlen, als Versicherungsvertreter zu arbeiten?”
41 Here I used the pre-transformation value of the overall satisfaction for the sake of
comparison with the industry-match variable
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able to treat them in a similar way and use them in the regression. Fur-
thermore, due to the voluntary character of the questionnaire, there is a
certain danger of selection-bias.
3.3.2 Effect of Experience on Total Wage
I will now turn to the analysis of the effects of experience on the wage of
insurance tied agents as outlined in Section 3.2. In a first step, I estimate
equation (3.5) using different regression methods.42 I also include a linear
version in the case of OLS and IV to get a better understanding of the net-
effects of the experience variables. The results are shown in Table 3.2. In
line with our expectations, we find a strong positive influence of the old
job indicator variable OJ, which shows that agents who have been with
their company for more than a year earn significantly more than those
who have just started. For the other independent variables, we see strong
differences between OLS, random effects GLS and IV estimation. As we
will see in Section 3.3.4, there is strong evidence that an IV approach is ap-
propriate in this case. Thus, we can conclude from the differences shown
in Table 3.2, that the wrong specification of the regression can indeed lead
to serious bias in the results.
In line with previous literature, we expect non-linearity of the experience
effects. Alongside the most common approach of including squared and
cubic terms for industry- and general experience (see Table 3.2), I also di-
vide them into ranges of five years, and include indicator variables to mea-
sure the effects of prior experience at these discrete knot-points (see Table
3.7 and 3.8). This gives us a more accurate view on the change of influence
these variables have as they increase. This analysis is conducted (i) for all
agents in the sample (ii) for agents with a tenure above nine years (which
is the median of the sample) and (iii) for agents with a tenure less or equal
to 9 years (see Figure 3.1(b) and 3.1(c)). This lets us determine if and how
42 I use robust standard errors in all regression types to account for heteroscedasticity,
see also Section 3.3.4
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Table 3.2: Comparison of tenure-effect on log(wage) using OLS, ran-
dom effects GLS, and Instrumental variables (2SLS) (with and without
higher order terms)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS GLS IV IV
OJ 1.259*** 1.014*** 0.845*** 0.856*** 0.832***
(15.87) (12.37) (11.22) (7.81) (7.52)
Tenure 0.0275*** 0.0799*** 0.0984*** 0.0870*** 0.106***
(21.13) (20.38) (16.02) (9.29) (5.43)
Sq(Tenure)x100 -0.178*** -0.219*** -0.0915
(-15.89) (-12.94) (-1.05)
Prior agent labor experience 0.00422* -0.0105 -0.0129 0.0291*** 0.0283*
(1.90) (-1.07) (-0.72) (6.19) (1.94)
Sq(Prior agent lab.ex.)x100 0.119 0.139 -0.0928
(0.95) (0.61) (-0.62)
(Prior agent lab.ex.3)x1000 -0.0154 -0.0177 0.0450
(-0.40) (-0.26) (0.99)
Non-agent labor experience 0.00320** -0.0158* -0.0135 0.0238*** 0.0340**
(2.19) (-1.83) (-0.90) (6.63) (1.96)
Sq(Non-agent lab.ex.)x100 0.135* 0.153 -0.0819
(1.75) (1.14) (-0.78)
(Non-agent lab.ex.3)x1000 -0.0289 -0.0347 0.0118
(-1.48) (-1.03) (0.50)
Years of education -0.00478 -0.0151 -0.0165 0.0249*** 0.106**
(-1.39) (-0.54) (-0.35) (4.41) (2.42)
Sq(Yrs. edu) 0.000166 0.000280 -0.00301**
(0.17) (0.17) (-2.28)
Job-match -0.121*** -0.116*** -0.131*** -0.102*** -0.103***
(-10.61) (-10.47) (-6.93) (-7.66) (-8.15)
Industry-match -0.00161 0.00339 0.00236 0.0354*** 0.0332***
(-0.20) (0.43) (0.17) (3.26) (3.08)
Observations 6890 6890 6890 6890 6890
Adjusted R2 0.514 0.530 0.362 0.415
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown; company-, initital portfolio- and years effects included
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the effect from prior agent-/general-experience is different for new start-
ing agents compared to longer-serving agents.
For presentational purposes, I multiplied the effects of the squared (cu-
bic) terms with 100 (1000) in order to reduce the number of leading zeros
of the coefficients. Furthermore, in all regressions, I control for company,
initial portfolio and year effects but do not report the results here. I will
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first focus on the overall effect of the different kinds of experience on the
wage development of the agent shown in Table 3.2. I will consider only
the estimates from the IV estimation as shown in columns (4) and (5) of
Table 3.2. As expected, we find a large positive and statistically significant
effect of tenure on the log(wage) of the agent both in the linear case and
also after inclusion of the quadratic term. Similarly, also the prior agent-
and general-experience have a positive relationship with log(wage). In
the linear version of the regression, the influence from agent-experience is
slightly higher than the one from general labor-market experience. After
inclusion of the higher order terms, however, the relations are inverted.
The development of the effects over the years can easily be examined
by looking at Figure 3.1(a). Here, I plotted the polynomial functions for
tenure, agent-experience and general labor-market experience based on
the coefficients given in Table 3.2, column (5).
As we can see, the effect of tenure slightly flattens as tenure increases. This
is in line with Ingraham (1973) and Dorfman (1976) although the effect
does not occur as early as predicted (Ingraham (1973) states that a plateau
would be reached after the third year). His focus, though, was on produc-
tion only. We will investigate this in Section 3.3.3. 43
I now turn to the effects of agent-experience and general labor-market ex-
perience. Again, for the sake of interpretation, I present the coefficients
from Table 3.2, column (5), by plotting the corresponding graphs. The re-
sulting curves are shown together with the tenure-development in Figure
3.1(a). We see that the positive relation between agent/non-agent experi-
ence and log(wage) is almost identical and linear up to 15 years of each
experience-type. Beyond this, the non-agent experience effect remains
quasi-linear while the agent-experience related influence increases quite
significantly. The surprising conclusion we can draw from this is that, for
the agent, it does not make much difference whether he has worked as an
43 In any case, we have to keep in mind that due to the logarithmic scale we use here,
a certain flattening of the wage curve can be expected as otherwise, the (real) wages
and linked to that, also the portfolios and new business Figures would increase ex-
ponentially till infinity what seems quite unreasonable given the effort-restrictions
of each agent
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insurance agent before, or whether he gathered experience in a different
industry. Only if he has worked for more than 15 years as an insurance
agent before, a slight advantage can be observed. Overall, we see that
each of the two experience components leads to an increase of total wage
by roughly 25% for 10 years of experience.
Up to now, we have looked only at the total of all agents, independent
of their tenure. Quite intuitively, one could suspect that the benefit the
agents have from prior (agent-)experience wears off after some time; i.e.,
the specific job-experience they gain on their current job becomes more
and more important, making the experience gained from prior jobs almost
insignificant. To test this hypothesis, I divide the two experience-variables
into clusters of five years44 (and an additional cluster for agents with zero
experience which serves as a reference category). The results from this
piecewise-regression are shown in Figures 3.1(b) and 3.1(c) as ”all agents”.
The shape of these piecewise regressions is in line with the continuous ver-
sion seen in Figure 3.1(a).
To investigate the influence of tenure on the effect from (non-)agent ex-
perience, I introduce an interaction term between the experience-clusters
and an indicator variable for above/below nine years45 of tenure. The
results we see in Figures 3.1(b) and 3.1(c) clearly show that what drives
the positive effect seen when looking at all agents are the agents with a
below-median tenure. In fact, agents with a tenure above nine years have
negative returns from prior experience. This relation is especially severe
in the case of prior agent-experience where the effect is negative on all ex-
perience levels, whilst for general labor-market experience, there is a pos-
itive effect at least for those agents with more than 11 years’ experience.
Furthermore, in Figure 3.1(b), we see that for agents with low tenure, the
positive effect is almost linearly increasing with the number of years. On
the other hand, for non-agent experience, we see a steep increase for those
agents with at least one year of experience compared to those with no ex-
44 In the case of prior TA (Tied Agent)-experience, I use fewer categories than for non-
agent experience as the number of samples per cluster would otherwise become very
small, leading to large bias from outliers
45 The sample median
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perience at all, but then the effect remains almost unchanged.
Overall, we can conclude that the influence of prior experience signifi-
cantly depends on the tenure of the agent and that the positive relation be-
tween experience and wage is mainly observed in the first years of tenure
and the relation can even become negative for agents with higher tenure.
3.3.3 Effect of Experience on Sub-Components of Wage
We have already developed some initial insights into the effects of expe-
rience on total wage. We now drill down into the four sub-categories of
agent compensation to find potential reasons for the observations made so
far.
Starting with the new business commissions, we see the results from the
regression in column (2) of Table 3.3 (for comparability with the previous
results, I also included the corresponding regression for total wage in the
first column of this Table). For tenure, we see a lower coefficient in the lin-
ear part but a slightly more curved shape of the parabola due to the more
negative coefficient of the squared term as we can see in Figure 3.2(a). As
already outlined, we can confirm a similar shape as seen in the total wage
case. Thus, we can partially support the findings of Ingraham (1973) and
Dorfman (1976) regarding the shape of the production curve of an agent,
although we find that the flattening of the curve is observed at a much
higher tenure than stated in their works. The coefficient of the linear prior-
agent experience term is small both in size and statistical significance. The
two higher order terms are both almost twice as large as for the total wage
case. This leads to a strong increase of the positive effect for large val-
ues of prior agent-experience as we can see in Figure 3.2(a). In the case
of non-agent experience, we actually see a negative effect, although again
statistically not significant. From Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b), we see that this
general shape is also confirmed by the more detailed, tenure-specific anal-
ysis. Here, we see that the extreme increase in the positive effect from high
levels of prior agent experience stems from those agents with low tenure.
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Table 3.3: Comparision of experience influence onto different compensa-
tion components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total NBC RC Boni Sal
OJ 0.832*** 1.083*** 1.133*** 1.560*** 0.426***
(7.52) (9.13) (6.25) (6.77) (3.74)
Tenure 0.106*** 0.0633*** 0.194*** 0.230*** -0.0811***
(5.43) (3.43) (7.40) (6.95) (-3.46)
Sq(Tenure)x100 -0.0915 -0.115 -0.285*** -0.651*** 0.194*
(-1.05) (-1.58) (-2.64) (-6.48) (1.92)
Prior agent labor experience 0.0283* 0.00946 0.0548*** 0.0516 0.0431**
(1.94) (0.66) (3.00) (1.57) (2.15)
Sq(Prior agent lab.ex.)x100 -0.0928 -0.203 -0.313 -0.726 -0.540*
(-0.62) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.79)
(Prior agent lab.ex.3)x1000 0.0450 0.0938 0.106 0.243 0.175
(0.99) (1.57) (1.40) (1.20) (1.50)
Non-agent labor experience 0.0340** -0.0211 0.0541** -0.0373 -0.0279
(1.96) (-1.04) (2.16) (-1.52) (-1.08)
Sq(Non-agent lab.ex.)x100 -0.0819 0.152 -0.192 0.0811 0.166
(-0.78) (1.16) (-1.20) (0.36) (1.01)
(Non-agent lab.ex.3)x1000 0.0118 -0.0295 0.0351 0.00641 -0.0259
(0.50) (-0.96) (0.95) (0.11) (-0.69)
Years of education 0.106** 0.0330 0.0586 -0.0947 -0.00584
(2.42) (0.68) (1.00) (-1.24) (-0.10)
Sq(Yrs. edu) -0.00301** -0.00155 -0.00108 0.00210 -0.000375
(-2.28) (-1.05) (-0.61) (0.80) (-0.21)
Job-match -0.103*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.151*** -0.0909***
(-8.15) (-8.75) (-7.19) (-4.69) (-5.09)
Industry-match 0.0332*** 0.0436*** 0.0191 0.0874*** 0.0122
(3.08) (3.85) (1.38) (4.05) (0.93)
Observations 6890 4521 5483 3176 3990
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.399 0.322 0.127 0.245
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown; company-, initital portfolio- and years effects included
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Figure 3.2: Influence of tenure, tied agent experience, and non-agent expe-
rience on the four sub-categories of compensation (see Table 3.3)
On the other hand, although not visible from the aggregated view, we now
also find a positive relationship between prior non-agent experience and
new business commissions, at least for agents with low tenure. This again
shows how important such a differentiated view is, although it is lacking
in most publications.
Looking at recurring commissions, the positive effect of tenure is much
stronger than in the case of new business, which is in line with our ex-
pectations formulated in Section 3.1. Again, we see a flattening log(wage)
curve in tenure.
Both types of prior experience have a large positive relation with the log-
arithm of recurring commissions and are almost of the same size (5% per
year for the linear components as we can see from column (3) of Table
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Figure 3.3: Discrete-estimation effect of prior agent and non-agent experi-
ence for different tenure levels on compensation components (see Tables
3.9 and 3.10)
3.3). These effects are therefore stronger than for the total wage, which can
potentially be attributed to the fact that previous labor-market experience
(whether job-specific or general) helps the agent to organize himself, gives
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him an air of seniority and thus makes him seem more trustworthy from
a customer’s perspective. These effects might lead to a reduced churn
rate and, as a consequence, to higher recurring commissions. Overall, the
shape of the tenure and the experience curves in Figure 3.2(b) resemble
that of the total wage regression curve. Also when looking at the tenure-
differentiation of the effects, we conclude from Figures 3.3(c) and 3.3(d)
that the effects are again similar to those observed for total wage. This is
quite reasonable, as we have seen already in Section 3.3.1 that the recur-
ring commissions account for a large part of the total compensation of the
agents. The size of all effects, however, is larger than in the total wage case
due to the logarithmic scale.
As bonification is usually linked to certain goals that need to be achieved,
one could assume that there should also be a positive effect from tenure on
bonification, as higher tenure leads to larger portfolios (as seen above) and
thus should ease the ability to reach sales goals. In line with this expec-
tation, we indeed find a positive relation between tenure and bonification
(see column (4) in Table 3.3), with the linear part being by far the largest
among all compensation components. When looking at the plotted de-
velopment in Figure 3.2(c), however, we see that the quite large negative
coefficient of the squared term leads to a peak at 18 years of tenure. Be-
yond that, the size of the effect decreases. We may regard this as a sign
of agents tending to be ever more successful in achieving their goals that
lead to these bonification with rising tenure but, at some point (maybe due
to a certain degree of fatigue) they reduce their effort and thus earn less
money from these contests.
For both the non-agent labor experience and the tied-agent experience,
the coefficients in the regression are statistically not significant. Thus,
we can not reject the hypothesis that there is no influence of these two
kinds of experience on the amount of bonification received by the agent.
Nonetheless, we see a rather large coefficient of 5% in the linear part of the
agent-experience compared to a negative coefficient of -3.7% for the non-
agent experience. This may indicate that prior experience as an insurance
agent at least slightly increases the likelihood of successfully participating
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in these contests. This seems reasonable as this form of on-top compen-
sation might be more familiar to those who have already worked in the
industry.
On the other hand, when looking at the tenure-differentiated Figures 3.3(e)
and 3.3(f), we observe again that low-tenured agents enjoy a positive effect
from both kinds of pre-experience, with the magnitude of the non-agent
experience being even higher for this group, whilst high-tenured agents
suffer quite severe losses.
Finally, when looking at the effect of experience on salary and subsidies in
column (5) of Table 3.3, we see a statistically significant negative effect of
the linear tenure coefficient. This translates into a U-shaped curve in Fig-
ure 3.2(d) which is in line with our expectations as subsidies and (fixed)
salary are usually paid only within the first couple of years after joining
the insurance company.
Regarding prior agent experience, we see a large positive relation of 4.3%
in the linear term with log(salary/subsidies). Although the coefficient of
the squared term is negative, we still see an increase of the agent-experience
curve in Figure 3.2(d). This is surprising, but might give an indication of
the nature of the recruiting practices of some insurance companies. In or-
der to lure tied agents away from their current jobs, hiring companies can
provide them with a higher fixed salary in the first years which is usually
seen as a prudent practice (see Churchill et al. (1985)). Again, the coef-
ficient of the non-agent labor experience is negative but statistically not
significant.
In the case of salary/subsidies, the tenure-based analysis as conducted for
the other components does not provide further insights, as there is a natu-
ral difference in how much is paid to low- compared to high-tenure agents,
so I omit it here.
To summarize, we find that the largest influence both of tenure and of
the other experience-types is observed on recurring commissions. Quite
surprisingly, we found no significant advantage of prior agent experience
above non-agent experience for new business commissions, although one
might have expected that this job-specific experience would enable agents
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to perform better at this sales-directed activity. Prior agent-experience,
however, does seem to enhance the likelihood of being successful in con-
tests leading to higher average bonification.
As with the total wage case, we also see a clear difference in the effects
for low-tenured agents and high-tenured agents. In all cases, the effects
are positive and stronger for those agents that have not been with the firm
for very long. Again, this seems to be a reasonable result, assuming that
skills gained on previous jobs are especially helpful at the beginning of a
new job. This beneficial effect might then be overridden by the experience
gained as tenure increases. Another reason for the strong difference be-
tween the two tenure-clusters might be that those with higher tenure are
also older.46
Both in the total wage and the compensation-component regressions, the
coefficient of the job-match variable is significantly negative. This surpris-
ing result might be attributed to a problem in the causality between wage
and the job-match proxy that was constructed from the job-satisfaction
score. In Chapter 4, I investigate the relation between income and job-
satisfaction. On the other hand, the industry-match variable gives quite
reasonable results and is in line with Parent (2002), who finds that the
matching-effect is usually of a smaller magnitude than the human capital
effects.
3.3.4 Robustness
As pointed out earlier, the IV-approach is widely accepted in the context of
estimating the influence of seniority and experience on wages. Nonethe-
less, from the short description of the workings of the IV estimator in
Section 3.2, it is also clear that the IV estimator is less efficient that an
OLS approach and thus should be used only if it is really required (see
46 As age is highly correlated with years of education, tenure, agent- and non-agent
experience I omit it in this regression, in line with Parent (2000)
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Wooldridge (2006)). The most common test that compares IV and OLS es-
timates is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test47, which I will use here. The aim
is to fit both models and then compare the resulting coefficient vectors.
More precisely (following the description in Baum (2006)), if I denote the
estimation results from OLS and IV with βOLS and βIV , respectively, we
derive the test statistic as
(βIV − βOLS)′ [Var(βIV )− Var(βOLS)]−1 (βIV − βOLS) ∼ χ2(k1)
with k1 being the number of regressors tested for endogeneity. The null
hypothesis of this test is that the difference in the coefficients of the two
estimators is not systematic. In this case, due to higher efficiency, the OLS
estimator should be used. In our case (with k1 = 3 as we test OJ, tenure
and tenure2 for endogeneity), we obtain a χ2(3) of 88.7 and thus can clearly
reject the null hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that the IV estimation is the
more appropriate estimator to be used in this case.
Another important factor to be tested is the question of heteroscedasticity.
Based on the work by Pagan & Hall (1983), many tests have been devel-
oped in the past that are also suitable for instrumental variable estimations
(I have used the STATA command ivhettest). With a Pagan-Hall gen-
eral test statistic of χ2 = 310.4, we can clearly reject the null hypothesis
of homoscedasticity. The standard Breusch-Pagan-test (Breusch & Pagan
(1979)) gives an even higher test score of 2,635.9. Therefore, I use robust
standard errors in all the estimations in order to correct the bias from het-
eroscedasticity in the sample.
After running a test on autocorrelation (see Wooldridge (2006)), we can
not reject the null-hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Thus, we assume that
there are no severe issues from autocorrelation present in our results.48
Finally, I also briefly discuss the question of how appropriate the chosen
instruments are. As already outlined, the choice of the instruments (the
deviation from the individual mean) has been well-tested in the past and
47 See also Hausman (1978) for further reading on this test
48 Running the regressions with autocorrelation robust estimators consequently leads
to very similar standard errors (results are not reported here)
73
proved to deliver meaningful results. Nonetheless, as we have seen in
Section 3.2, if the correlation between the instrument and the underlying
variable is weak, the standard errors may become very large, leading to a
huge sampling variance of the IV estimator. Based on the suggestion by
Bound et al. (1995), I report here the partial R2 and F -statistic values for
the three variables to be instrumented: OJ (Partial R2 = 0.72, F -statistic
= 1, 509.4), tenure (Partial R2 = 0.09, F -statistic = 422.9) and tenure2 (Par-
tial R2 = 0.04, F -statistic = 115.0). The partial R2 values are of interest as
they show the correlation between the variable and its instrument. They
are large enough to keep the bias at a reasonable level, given the compa-
rably large sample size. Furthermore, Bound et al. (1995) point out, that
F -statistics close to 1 should be a cause for concern. Staiger & Stock (1997)
report that a common rule of thumb for a single endogenous regressor is
an F -statistic of 10. In our case, all F -statistics are far above this threshold.
The critical values provided in Stock et al. (2002) are also well below the
F -statistics reported here.49
Finally, also running the regressions described here with additional con-
trol variables leads to very similar results. Table 3.11 shows the results of
the regressions using number of employees as additional control variable.
We see that there is almost no difference to Table 3.3. Thus, the observed
effects do not seem to stem from managerial effects that may go along with
higher tenure or experience.
Overall, the robustness tests conducted show that the IV method and its
specifications should yield consistent estimates of the effects under con-
sideration.
49 As pointed out by Shea (1997), the partial R2 value can be misleading in the case
of multiple endogenous variables. The reason being, that even if just one of the in-
struments would be a valid one for the endogenous variables (i.e., the model would
basically be underspecified), the partial R2 by Bound et al. (1995) could still be high.
In our case, the proposed ”Shea partial R2” values, that take care of this potential
underspecification, are 0.41, 0.05 and 0.03 for OJ, tenure and tenure2, respectively.
We therefore conclude, that there is only a small danger of underidentification
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, I investigated the effects of different kinds of experience on
the wage of tied agents in the German insurance industry. I started off
defining an equation to describe the mechanics of the log(wage) estima-
tion both with and without an explicit inclusion of matching variables.
Adopting the approach by Parent (2000), I not only considered a term for
general labor-market experience but also for industry-specific experience
(i.e., past experience as insurance tied agent at another company).
There is indeed a significant effect of all kinds of experience on the wage
of an agent, in line with the findings of McDaniel et al. (1988). Regarding
tenure, the increase of wage is very steep at the beginning as the agent
builds up his customer base but eventually flattens albeit at a much later
tenure than suggested in Ingraham (1973) and Dorfman (1976). For prior
agent- and general-labor experience, there is a significant positive effect,
which is of a similar magnitude to the overall wage level. This is quite a
different result to that of Dustmann & Meghir (2005), who report that the
general labor-experience effect is much higher than the industry-specific
one. Nonetheless, for very high levels of prior agent experience, its ef-
fect increases strongly compared to non-agent experience. Therefore, it
seems that there is indeed a certain advantage of agent-specific experience
above general labor-market experience. This is in line with the finding
by Churchill et al. (1985) who suggest that such people are more likely to
have developed the necessary skills and may be less likely to suffer from
inaccurate or ambiguous role perception. By investigating the causal rea-
sons for this effect, we find that the main driver for the increase is a higher
level of bonification as well as salary and subsidies. We therefore suspect
that prior agent experience mainly leads to higher subsidies being paid in
order to lure agents away from their current employer.
Furthermore, I present one of the first studies that distinguishes the ef-
fect from past experience for different tenure levels. We see that the two
kinds of experience (agent and non-agent experience) both have a signif-
icant positive effect for low-tenured agents. This is observed for the total
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wage as well as for its sub-components. On the other hand, high-tenured
agents can even suffer losses due to their greater prior experience. This
surprising result may be attributable to age-effects.
Although the results of this work seem to be quite robust to changes in the
specification, there are some caveats mainly attributable to the data-set.
A major source of bias may be that the set contains only those agents that
were still employed in 2005, i.e., agents that might have been with the firm
in 2003 but who quit in 2004 are not captured in the sample. Therefore, we
face a certain selection bias, which may lead to errors when calculating the
returns on experience.
Furthermore, the proxies used for the matching variables could be, due to
the fact that they have been collected via a questionnaire, subject to bias
driven by the overall satisfaction of the agent with the company. Thus,
it may well be that an agent who is unhappy with his current employer
would also deem the whole industry as not being a good match for him.
In addition, these variables are time-invariant and, therefore, do not reflect
potential changes within the three year period of observation.
In addition, effects from job mobility and other fixed individual effects
cannot be controlled for. As outlined by Altonji & Williams (1998), this is
certainly a cause for concern. They propose a first-differencing approach
that would eliminate these fixed-effects. This method, however, requires
some variance in general- and industry-specific labor market experience
on an individual level over time. Given the structure of the data-set, this
is unfortunately not the case. Nonetheless, as already pointed out, the
results by Parent (2009) and Lemieux et al. (2009) suggest, that these in-
dividual fixed-effects might have only a comparably small variance as I
focus on sales workers with ”commission pay”, only.
With these limitations in mind, I think that this work adds a new angle
to the discussion as to how experience influences wages. The distinction
between different tenure-groups to analyze the effect of prior experience
for these groups individually, has, to my knowledge, not been used be-
fore. Given the instructive results, I feel that these new techniques are
very helpful in better understanding the effects at work.
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3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table 3.4: Mean and standard deviation of key variables (2003 only)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Total commission 62,127.4 (36,951.5) 1,738
New business commission 34,160.1 (22,724.0) 1,318
Recurring commission 23,255.5 (16,402.9) 1,310
Bonification 6,092.6 (5,485.2) 176
Fix salary/subsidies 5,943.8 (5,748.8) 1,273
Tenure 10.7 (8.5) 1,738
Prior agent labor experience 2.2 (4.3) 1,738
Non-agent labor experience 10.4 (7.0) 1,738
OJ 0.9 (0.2) 1,738
Table 3.5: Mean and standard deviation of key variables (2004 only)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Total commission 56,568.4 (41,665.5) 2,314
New business commission 39,412.1 (25,339.3) 1,393
Recurring commission 21,546.3 (15,283.4) 1,874
Bonification 4,012.3 (5,034.8) 1,304
Fix salary/subsidies 5,867.9 (5,591.3) 1,347
Tenure 10.8 (8.2) 2,314
Prior agent labor experience 1.8 (3.9) 2,314
Non-agent labor experience 11.0 (7.2) 2,314
OJ 1.0 (0.2) 2,314
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Table 3.6: Mean and standard deviation of key variables (2005 only)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Total commission 44,652.4 (34,231.5) 2,838
New business commission 21,227.5 (15,691.0) 1,812
Recurring commission 19,868.4 (15,792.4) 2,341
Bonification 4,139.7 (4,538.8) 1,699
Fix salary/subsidies 5,067 (5,408.3) 1,394
Tenure 10.3 (8.1) 2,838
Prior agent labor experience 2.0 (4.1) 2,838
Non-agent labor experience 11.3 (7.3) 2,838
OJ 0.9 (0.2) 2,838
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Table 3.7: Comparison of effect of prior agent-experience for above- and
below-median tenures
(1) (2)
IV-all IV-tenure
OJ 0.830*** 0.821***
(7.48) (7.32)
Tenure 0.106*** 0.117***
(5.43) (5.61)
Sq(Tenure)x100 -0.0920 -0.105
(-1.05) (-1.16)
TA-exp 1 0.0625 0.287***
(1.58) (3.40)
TA-exp 5 0.185*** 0.443***
(2.98) (4.80)
TA-exp 10 0.277*** 0.545***
(3.17) (4.73)
TA-exp 15 0.547*** 0.842***
(4.21) (5.44)
(TA-exp 1)x(tenure > 9) -0.479***
(-4.14)
(TA-exp 5)x(tenure > 9) -0.703***
(-5.85)
(TA-exp 10)x(tenure > 9) -0.740***
(-5.91)
(TA-exp 15)x(tenure > 9) -0.918***
(-5.94)
Non-agent labor experience 0.0311* 0.0300*
(1.83) (1.71)
Sq(Non-agent lab.ex.)x100 -0.0621 -0.0693
(-0.60) (-0.65)
(Non-agent lab.ex.3)x1000 0.00765 0.0131
(0.33) (0.54)
Years of education 0.106** 0.123***
(2.42) (2.68)
Sq(Yrs. edu) -0.00303** -0.00359***
(-2.29) (-2.59)
Job-match -0.101*** -0.105***
(-7.97) (-8.28)
Industry-match 0.0326*** 0.0260**
(3.04) (2.54)
Observations 6890 6890
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.403
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown; company-, initital portfolio- and years effects included
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Table 3.8: Comparison of effect of non-agent-experience for above- and
below-median tenures
(1) (2)
IV-all IV-tenure
OJ 0.833*** 0.748***
(7.55) (6.34)
Tenure 0.106*** 0.166***
(5.46) (6.70)
Sq(Tenure)x100 -0.0912 -0.175**
(-1.04) (-2.00)
non-TA-exp 1 0.235** 0.949***
(2.52) (3.92)
non-TA-exp 5 0.280** 1.001***
(2.57) (4.11)
non-TA-exp 10 0.418*** 1.000***
(2.99) (3.98)
non-TA-exp 15 0.509*** 1.128***
(3.21) (4.30)
non-TA-exp 20 0.548*** 1.142***
(3.23) (4.33)
non-TA-exp 25 0.687*** 1.213***
(3.58) (4.26)
(non-TA-exp 1)x(tenure > 9) -1.101***
(-4.41)
(non-TA-exp 5)x(tenure > 9) -1.113***
(-4.97)
(non-TA-exp 10)x(tenure > 9) -0.851***
(-4.50)
(non-TA-exp 15)x(tenure > 9) -0.910***
(-5.26)
(non-TA-exp 20)x(tenure > 9) -0.890***
(-5.50)
(non-TA-exp 25)x(tenure > 9) -0.836***
(-4.70)
Prior agent labor experience 0.0287** 0.0233
(1.98) (1.57)
Sq(Prior agent lab.ex.)x100 -0.0964 -0.102
(-0.64) (-0.65)
(Prior agent lab.ex.3)x1000 0.0461 0.0550
(1.03) (1.16)
Years of education 0.0978** 0.0824**
(2.34) (2.04)
Sq(Yrs. edu) -0.00272** -0.00200
(-2.15) (-1.64)
Job-match -0.102*** -0.106***
(-8.07) (-8.12)
Industry-match 0.0345*** 0.0205**
(3.15) (2.10)
Observations 6890 6890
Adjusted R2 0.412 0.377
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown; company-, initital portfolio- and years effects included
Table 3.9: Comparison of effect of prior agent-experience for above- and
below-median tenures for the four different compensation sub-categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NBC RC Boni Sal
OJ 1.079*** 1.105*** 1.536*** 0.426***
(9.00) (6.03) (6.58) (3.68)
Tenure 0.0664*** 0.208*** 0.250*** -0.0806***
(3.33) (7.38) (6.84) (-3.30)
Sq(Tenure)x100 -0.119 -0.304*** -0.686*** 0.194*
(-1.64) (-2.73) (-6.47) (1.93)
TA-exp 1 0.0257 0.400*** 0.348*** 0.0554
(0.28) (3.55) (3.05) (0.57)
TA-exp 5 0.0827 0.726*** 0.509*** 0.101
(0.83) (6.10) (3.61) (0.89)
TA-exp 10 0.0178 0.571*** 0.326** 0.0839
(0.14) (3.21) (2.20) (0.51)
TA-exp 15 0.342** 1.079*** 0.452* 0.241
(2.13) (5.78) (1.65) (1.08)
(TA-exp 1)x(tenure > 9) -0.0922 -0.640*** -0.521*** 0.00763
(-0.70) (-4.02) (-3.16) (0.06)
(TA-exp 5)x(tenure > 9) -0.256** -1.038*** -1.180*** -0.0184
(-1.97) (-6.54) (-4.98) (-0.13)
(TA-exp 10)x(tenure > 9) -0.150 -0.745*** -1.164*** -0.187
(-0.98) (-3.66) (-3.96) (-1.00)
(TA-exp 15)x(tenure > 9) -0.731*** -1.219*** -0.833** -0.577**
(-4.24) (-5.83) (-2.49) (-2.47)
Non-agent labor experience -0.0220 0.0569** -0.0325 -0.0301
(-1.03) (2.18) (-1.32) (-1.12)
Sq(Non-agent lab.ex.)x100 0.156 -0.239 0.0290 0.182
(1.10) (-1.42) (0.13) (1.05)
(Non-agent lab.ex.3)x1000 -0.0291 0.0510 0.0228 -0.0292
(-0.87) (1.30) (0.39) (-0.73)
Years of education 0.0431 0.0922 -0.0358 -0.00430
(0.81) (1.47) (-0.47) (-0.07)
Sq(Yrs. edu) -0.00188 -0.00220 0.000158 -0.000416
(-1.16) (-1.15) (0.06) (-0.21)
Job-match -0.123*** -0.127*** -0.161*** -0.0904***
(-8.94) (-7.53) (-5.02) (-5.11)
Industry-match 0.0423*** 0.00988 0.0783*** 0.0124
(3.90) (0.75) (3.64) (0.97)
Observations 4521 5483 3176 3990
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.311 0.124 0.244
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown; company-, initital portfolio- and years effects included
81
Table 3.10: Comparison of effect of non-agent-experience for above- and
below-median tenures for the four different compensation sub-categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NBC RC Boni Sal
OJ 1.049*** 0.998*** 1.367*** 0.437***
(8.08) (5.14) (5.58) (3.49)
Tenure 0.0875*** 0.279*** 0.307*** -0.0899***
(3.23) (7.83) (6.94) (-3.08)
Sq(Tenure)x100 -0.152** -0.413*** -0.727*** 0.206**
(-2.15) (-3.93) (-6.66) (2.13)
non-TA-exp 1 0.186 1.333*** 0.677*** -0.223
(0.68) (3.84) (3.10) (-0.76)
non-TA-exp 5 0.228 1.450*** 0.808*** -0.180
(0.84) (4.20) (3.73) (-0.60)
non-TA-exp 10 0.141 1.363*** 0.568*** -0.222
(0.50) (3.88) (2.58) (-0.72)
non-TA-exp 15 0.267 1.548*** 0.727*** -0.144
(0.94) (4.35) (3.16) (-0.47)
non-TA-exp 20 0.212 1.541*** 0.692*** -0.0510
(0.74) (4.25) (2.86) (-0.16)
non-TA-exp 25 0.245 1.631*** 0.628** -0.0802
(0.72) (4.10) (2.11) (-0.23)
(non-TA-exp 1)x(tenure > 9) -0.337 -1.490*** -1.211*** 0.251
(-1.19) (-4.32) (-4.90) (0.88)
(non-TA-exp 5)x(tenure > 9) -0.452* -1.475*** -1.400*** 0.156
(-1.82) (-4.91) (-5.90) (0.62)
(non-TA-exp 10)x(tenure > 9) -0.313 -1.183*** -1.275*** 0.157
(-1.43) (-4.43) (-5.09) (0.69)
(non-TA-exp 15)x(tenure > 9) -0.434** -1.192*** -1.535*** 0.0399
(-2.24) (-5.16) (-6.24) (0.21)
(non-TA-exp 20)x(tenure > 9) -0.497*** -1.082*** -1.527*** -0.120
(-2.60) (-4.78) (-5.36) (-0.64)
(non-TA-exp 25)x(tenure > 9) -0.329 -1.009*** -1.478*** -0.211
(-1.43) (-3.99) (-3.99) (-0.85)
Prior agent labor experience 0.00430 0.0413** 0.0383 0.0426**
(0.31) (2.34) (1.16) (2.18)
Sq(Prior agent lab.ex.)x100 -0.146 -0.160 -0.571 -0.539*
(-0.83) (-0.70) (-1.06) (-1.79)
(Prior agent lab.ex.3)x1000 0.0774 0.0443 0.200 0.183
(1.31) (0.59) (0.97) (1.57)
Years of education 0.0346 0.0263 -0.0698 0.00502
(0.80) (0.49) (-0.91) (0.09)
Sq(Yrs. edu) -0.00154 0.000354 0.00164 -0.000779
(-1.19) (0.22) (0.62) (-0.48)
Job-match -0.121*** -0.126*** -0.149*** -0.0916***
(-8.77) (-7.23) (-4.61) (-5.15)
Industry-match 0.0385*** -0.000676 0.0664*** 0.0148
(4.03) (-0.06) (3.16) (1.24)
Observations 4521 5483 3176 3990
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.296 0.140 0.246
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown; company-, initital portfolio- and years effects included
Table 3.11: Comparision of experience influence onto different compensa-
tion components including number of employees as control variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total NBC RC Boni Sal
OJ 0.853*** 1.097*** 1.161*** 1.576*** 0.432***
(7.78) (9.54) (6.48) (6.94) (3.84)
Tenure 0.108*** 0.0671*** 0.198*** 0.232*** -0.0783***
(5.65) (3.76) (7.67) (7.15) (-3.38)
Sq(Tenure)x100 -0.0991 -0.127* -0.296*** -0.660*** 0.186*
(-1.15) (-1.79) (-2.78) (-6.66) (1.86)
Prior agent labor experience 0.0248* 0.00589 0.0504*** 0.0490 0.0410**
(1.71) (0.42) (2.81) (1.50) (2.06)
Sq(Prior agent lab.ex.)x100 -0.0911 -0.184 -0.288 -0.717 -0.528*
(-0.60) (-1.06) (-1.28) (-1.36) (-1.76)
(Prior agent lab.ex.3)x1000 0.0503 0.0901 0.102 0.242 0.173
(1.08) (1.53) (1.38) (1.20) (1.49)
Non-agent labor experience 0.0346** -0.0234 0.0522** -0.0402 -0.0283
(2.03) (-1.18) (2.10) (-1.63) (-1.11)
Sq(Non-agent lab.ex.)x100 -0.106 0.153 -0.194 0.0912 0.158
(-1.03) (1.18) (-1.22) (0.41) (0.97)
(Non-agent lab.ex.3)x1000 0.0179 -0.0295 0.0358 0.00411 -0.0239
(0.76) (-0.97) (0.98) (0.07) (-0.64)
Years of education 0.0993** 0.0299 0.0536 -0.0991 -0.00668
(2.31) (0.63) (0.93) (-1.30) (-0.11)
Sq(Yrs. edu) -0.00277** -0.00146 -0.000918 0.00224 -0.000338
(-2.13) (-1.01) (-0.52) (0.85) (-0.19)
Job-match -0.117*** -0.125*** -0.133*** -0.156*** -0.0918***
(-9.28) (-9.39) (-8.03) (-4.84) (-5.19)
Industry-match 0.0456*** 0.0540*** 0.0353** 0.0972*** 0.0186
(4.33) (4.85) (2.57) (4.47) (1.44)
No. employees -0.163*** -0.182*** -0.210*** -0.147*** -0.111***
(-12.55) (-12.19) (-11.99) (-4.55) (-6.91)
Observations 6890 4521 5483 3176 3990
Adjusted R2 0.434 0.431 0.345 0.132 0.255
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown; company-, initital portfolio- and years effects included
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Chapter 4
Reference-Point Dependency of
Pay Satisfaction
4.1 Introduction
In most of today’s work relationships, the satisfaction of the worker with
his or her employer has become an important aspect. As a consequence,
many employers have started to launch surveys on employee satisfaction
to make this very subjective, short-lived and fuzzy concept become more
tangible.
Even though interpreting the results of such a subjective variable causes
certain difficulties, it is a valuable source for new insights (see e.g., Le´vy-
Garboua & Montmarquette (2004), Freeman (1978)). It has to be noted that
there are many factors that influence employee satisfaction, including job
location, training offered, career aspects, job security and compensation.
With such a broad range of levers, it can become quite difficult to distin-
guish individual effects. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence as presented in
Rees (1993) shows that this topic is far more than just an academic artifact.
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In this work, I therefore focus on the influence of compensation on satisfac-
tion. More precisely, I investigate both the effect of absolute compensation
on satisfaction and whether there are any reference points that employees
use to benchmark their own compensation. To avoid having to consider
(and measure) a wide variety of potentially influential intrinsic and ex-
trinsic variables, I take advantage of the data-set as described in Chapter
1, that asked not only for overall satisfaction with the employer but also
for satisfaction with the total compensation. Thus, I can concentrate on the
pure compensation effects.
There have been numerous publications regarding the influence of com-
pensation on employee satisfaction in the past.50 I will give a brief overview
on those publications that seem to be most relevant in this context.
The recent work by Ko¨szegi & Rabin (2006) suggests that the reference-
point is endogenously determined by the rational expectation of the agent’s
outcomes. I will pick-up this point later when formulating my own hy-
pothesis regarding the applicable reference-point in the model.
One of the empirical proofs for the reference-dependency of wages is re-
ported by Clark & Oswald (1996) who investigated 5,000 British employ-
ees and found that the overall satisfaction of the workers did in fact de-
pend on the ratio of actual income and a ”reference income” derived us-
ing fitted values of a wage regression equation.51 Furthermore, they found
little support that worker’s satisfaction is a function of absolute income.
They also investigated the effects on satisfaction with pay. Here, naturally
a much stronger positive effect of absolute income on pay satisfaction was
reported but the negative effect of the reference income remained. A sim-
ilar effect was found by Nguyena et al. (2003) who used the National Ed-
ucational Longitudinal Study to investigate the drivers of job satisfaction,
splitting it into four different sub-categories of satisfaction. Their data sug-
50 The recent publications by Clark et al. (2009), Luttmer (2005) and Stutzer (2004) find,
that a reference-dependency does not only exist in the employer-employee relation-
ship but also among people living in the same neighborhood
51 Although they include a total of 77 occupation- and 61 industry-dummies, there
are no further details given regarding the differences in the effects across occupa-
tions/industries
85
gested that the influence of relative income on satisfaction with compen-
sation is small compared to the effect of the absolute wage level.
Empirical evidence for reference-dependent preferences is also given in
Camerer et al. (1997). This work argues that the expected wage acts as a
reference-point and that taxicab drivers usually make labor supply de-
cisions one day at a time, and set a loose daily income target and quit
working once they reach that target. Interestingly, in the work by Groot
& van Maassen den Brink (1999), it is found that the positive effect of
higher wages on job satisfaction wears off after some time as the employee
gets accustomed to this level of compensation (called ”preference drift”).
More evidence for the importance of expected wages as a reference-point
is found in the work by Mas (2006) who showed that in the case of police
officers, their performance significantly increased (decreased) if the wage-
raise as demanded by their union was accepted (not accepted). Thus, even
in those cases when the absolute wage in fact increased, their performance
nevertheless dipped.
Some research reports that utility from a job is determined largely by wage
changes over time (see, e.g., Rees (1993)). Similar findings are found by
Grund & Sliwka (2005) who use 19 waves of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), a large representative German survey. There, a positive re-
lationship between monthly wage and overall satisfaction and a negative
relationship between the previous year’s wage and overall satisfaction is
reported. This supports the assumption that the previous year’s income is
seen as a reference income for many employees. In addition, they predict
and also find in the data a negative effect of tenure on overall satisfaction.
An interesting different spin to this topic is given by Brown et al. (2008)
who suggest that it is not even the relative amount of money the employer
earns that influences the satisfaction level but rather the ranking among
his co-workers. They support this claim with data both from a laboratory
setting and the analysis of 16,000 British employees.
One of the most often analyzed phenomenon in the context of reference
points is ”loss aversion”. Due to its intuitive nature, it has been a vast
field of research in the past years. Generally it means that people feel that
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a loss reduces their utility far more than a comparable gain would increase
it. The seminal work by Tversky & Kahneman (1991) develops a strong
reference-dependency model, based on their prospect theory described in
Kahneman & Tversky (1979). Another approach was suggested by Gul
(1991) who develops an axiomatic model of ”disappointment aversion”
that generalizes the expected utility model. Empirical evidence for the
theoretic base is presented by Heath et al. (1999). Using several fictitious
scenarios with participants in a laboratory experiment, they found that
there is a strong notion of people feeling that they failed when they did
not meet their (self- or externally-imposed) goals even if, objectively, they
performed better than before. This underlines the perception of people not
always being completely rational but rather comparing their achievements
with ”what should be” states. This behavior was found in all areas of busi-
ness and private life (e.g., seller behavior in residential real estate markets,
see Genesove & Mayer (2001) or behavior of bettors in horse races, see Jul-
lien & Salanie´ (2000)). The work by Herweg et al. (2008) suggests that to
deal with loss aversion of an agent, a pure bonus contract would be op-
timal, which would specify a certain amount of money to be paid to the
agent upon achieving the set goals.
Prendergast (1999) already stated that real-life contracts are usually far less
sophisticated and complex than those derived from common economic
methods. Lazear & Oyer (2007) reiterates this point, and the question re-
mains unresolved. In general, there is even a question as to whether in-
centives really do have a positive effect on performance (e.g., Gneezy &
Rustichini (2000), Camerer & Hogarth (1999)).
Goette et al. (2004) suggest that workers have behaviorally relevant in-
come targets that act as a reference-point for their daily labor supply. The
work by Fehr & Goette (2007) gives some empirical evidence to support
this hypothesis. They investigated the amount of effort employees pro-
vide if their income is increased. Here, they find that the bike messengers
under consideration would increase the number of shifts they work but
reduce the effort made during each shift. They conclude that this may be
a sign of their loss aversion and that once they have reached their respec-
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tive reference income they see no need to work as hard. The notion that
increased wage has no effect on daily effort was also reported in Goette
& Huffman (2003) who use data from two different firms. Shalev (2000)
showed existence of a myopic loss-aversion equilibrium by using meth-
ods of game theory.
In many of the cited analyses, the effect of wage on total job satisfaction
was found to be rather limited if statistically significant at all. One expla-
nation for these findings is provided by Lydon & Chevalier (2002) who
claim that wage is not usually an exogenous variable, as assumed in many
models. They show that using an instrumental variable approach on wage
doubles its effect.
Meza & Webb (2007) explicitly model employer loss aversion in the con-
text of executive compensation and find that this can lead to pay being
insensitive to performance differences (at a certain performance-interval).
Neuman & Neuman (2008) try to substantiate the theoretical aspects of
loss aversion with another empirical study. Using discrete choice experi-
ments (giving candidates different scenarios to choose from, thus deriving
their utility-maximizing choice) in the medical sector, they find evidence
for loss aversion among the candidates.
Overall, a broad range of literature has been published that deals with
various aspects of (pay) satisfaction and reference points. I contribute to
this discussion by providing empirical evidence for a peer-group-specific
reference-point.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The model is de-
scribed in Section 4.2 where I also introduce the peer-groups used to test
the reference-dependency of the pay satisfaction. Section 4.3 gives a short
introduction to the statistical methods used in this work, with a focus on
how to interpret the coefficients of the ordered probit regression. In Sec-
tion 4.4, I describe the data-set used in this chapter, the results and the
derived implications regarding the influence of different wage forms on
job satisfaction. Section 4.5 discusses the findings and gives an outlook on
future research questions.
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4.2 The Model
To estimate the influence of compensation on satisfaction with pay, we
have to control both for the different salary-related variables captured in
a vector ~Si and the individual characteristics ~Xi of an agent i in order to
isolate the effects. Thus, I estimate the satisfaction with pay using a latent
variable model:
Yi = ~β
T ~Si + ~γ
T ~Xi + ²i
where Yi is the pay satisfaction score of agent i.
In the first specification of Section 4.4.2, I use only total compensation or
the four sub-categories of compensation as the independent salary-related
variables. In a second step, when testing for reference-point dependency
of pay satisfaction, I add the relative deviation of each agent from a ”peer-
group specific median” and test their influence using indicator variables
for discrete ranges of deviation (see Section 4.4.3). In all cases, I use age,
tenure and company indicator variables to describe the agents’ individual
characteristics.
In order to construct meaningful peer-groups, I specify multiple tenure
clusters. To account for newly hired agents, one cluster contains agents
with a tenure of zero. The next cluster contains agents with a tenure of one
to five years, and so on, with the last two clusters being those with a tenure
of 36 to 40 years and above 40 years.52 I then calculate the median (to
reduce bias from outliers) of the corresponding compensation component
for each tenure cluster in each company and the relative deviation of each
individual from this median (i.e., the absolute deviation divided by the
corresponding median). This relative deviation is split into a set of dummy
variables to indicate how much (and in which direction) the individual
agent deviates from the peer-group median.
52 I obtain similar results when introducing clusters for each individual year although
this comes at the cost of reduced statistical significance as some of the ”company-
tenure-deviation” triples contain no or only very few observations
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This means, we can write for the definition of N tenure-clusters Tj :
T1 = {i : i ∈ N0 ∧ i ≤ L1}
Tj = {i : i ∈ N0 ∧ Lj−1 < i ≤ Lj} , j = 2, . . . , N − 1
TN = {i : i ∈ N0 ∧ i > LN}
with Lj being the cut-off levels that limit a tenure cluster. In this case, we
have N = 9 and, as outlined above, L1 = 0, L2 = 5, L3 = 10, . . . , L9 = 40.
Then, assuming that we have M companies identified via a unique com-
pany ID running from 1, . . . ,M attached to each agent i via cIDi , the def-
inition of the peer-group median Pkj and the individual agents absolute
deviation Di and relative deviation Ri are:
Pkj = Med(si) if cIDi = k ∧ ti ∈ Tj
Di = si − Pkj if cIDi = k ∧ ti ∈ Tj
Ri =
Di
Pkj
if cIDi = k ∧ ti ∈ Tj
with si being the salary component of the vector ~Si and ti being the tenure
of agent i being analyzed.
For my analysis, I use indicator variables for discrete ranges of the devi-
ation variable under consideration with K − 1 knots denoted B1 < B2 <
· · · < BK−1:
I1 :=
1 : Ri ≤ B10 : else
Ij :=
1 : Bj−1 < Ri ≤ Bj0 : else , j = 2, . . . , K − 1
IK :=
1 : Ri > BK−10 : else
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With this formal notation defined, we can formulate the latent variable
model we will test in the course of the reference-dependency analysis:
Yi =
K∑
j=2
ηjIj + ~β∗
T ~S∗i + ~γ
T ~Xi + ²i
where the star denotes that we reduced the dimension of the salary-related
vector ~Si by one (being the variable now being modeled via the indicator
functions). Without loss of generality, I dropped the first indicator func-
tion to act as a reference.
In my calculations, I chose the following 11 knots Bj that divide the rela-
tive deviation into K = 12 ranges: −90%, −70%, −50%, −30%, −10%, 0%,
10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, 90%. If not stated otherwise, I used the category 0%
to 10% as well as Company C as reference categories in the regression.53
4.3 Methodological Background
To avoid the complications that accompany survey data on job satisfaction,
I apply the ordered probit model (see, e.g., McKelvey & Zavoina (1975)).
The downside of the ordered probit regression is that it can be quite cum-
bersome to interpret the results correctly (see LeClere (1999) or Anderson
(1984) for several methods). This is also the reason why in many scientific
publications, only the sign of the coefficients of an ordered probit analysis
is considered whilst the magnitude of the effect is neglected. However,
this way valuable information is lost. Therefore, I will not only conduct
the ordered probit regression, but also attach a marginal effects analysis
to understand the changing effect that compensation has on satisfaction
depending on the level of compensation.
Before interpreting the results of my analysis, I give a brief overview on the
53 The reason why the middle categories have been chosen in 10% rather than 20%
steps is to have a finer grid around the expected reference-point
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theoretical background of the ordered probit model to better understand
the meaning of the results. A good introduction into how to implement
these methods with Stata is given in Long & Freese (2006), from which I
also draw in the introduction to the multinomial regression model.
Running an ordered probit regression of independent variables ~X on a
dependent categorial variable Y , we get a set of coefficients β for the in-
dependent variables as well as k− 1 cut points µ1, . . . , µk−1 that divide the
curve of the density function into k sections. These cut points are usually
automatically calculated by the statistical program using the maximum
likelihood procedure. Using a latent variable model, as in the previous
section, we can calculate a prediction of the z-score by Y ∗ := ~βT ~X+α with
α being the identically and independently distributed error term. Now, if
Y ∗ < µ1, we would predict Y = 1, if µ1 < Y ∗ < µ2, Y = 2, ..., if Y ∗ > µk−1,
Y = k. Given the density function of the error term α, Φ, we find that:54
Pr(Y = 1) = Pr(Y ∗ < µ1) = Pr(~βT ~X + α < µ1)
= Pr(α < µ1 − ~βT ~X) = Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X)
Pr(Y = 2) = Pr(µ1 ≤ Y ∗ < µ2) = Pr(µ1 ≤ ~βT ~X + α < µ2)
= Pr(α < µ2 − ~βT ~X)− Pr(α < µ1 − ~βT ~X)
= Φ(µ2 − ~βT ~X)− Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X)
...
Pr(Y = k) = Pr(Y ∗ ≥ µk−1) = Pr(~βT ~X + α ≥ µk−1)
= Pr(α ≥ µk−1 − ~βT ~X) = 1− Pr(α < µk−1 − ~βT ~X)
= 1− Φ(µk−1 − ~βT ~X)
Now, we can see what the effect of a shift in one of the independent vari-
ables means: An increase by 1 unit of the variable X1 leads to an increase
of the z-score by β1X1. This means that for a discrete change in the inde-
54 Here, the parallel regression assumption is required (compare Long & Freese (2006)),
stating that the coefficient vector β is the same for all possible outcomes of the cat-
egorical variable. See also the discussion regarding the robustness of the model in
Section 4.4.4
92
pendent variable Xj from a to b and holding all other variables constant,
the predicted probability of the outcome Y = m changes according to:
4Pr(Y = m| ~X)
4Xj = Pr(Y = m|
~X,Xj = b)− Pr(Y = m| ~X,Xj = a)
The marginal effect then is basically only the infinitesimal change if we let
the difference between a and b go to zero.
Using the notation above, we can write
4Pr(Y = 1| ~X)
4Xj = Φ(µ1 −
~βT ~X|Xj = b)− Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X|Xj = a)
= Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X − βj(b− a)|Xj = b)− Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X|Xj = b)
If we assume a discrete change by one unit, i.e., b − a = 1, then the above
equation simplifies to (dropping the conditionality condition):
4Pr(Y = 1| ~X)
4Xj = Φ(µ1 −
~βT ~X − βj)− Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X)
From this equation, we can see that if the coefficient of the independent
variable Xj is positive (i.e., βj > 0), the difference Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X − βj) −
Φ(µ1 − ~βT ~X) is negative, given the fact that the probability density func-
tion Φ is monotonously increasing and therefore a shift by βj to the left of
the density curve reduces the probability of Y = 1. Conversely, if βj < 0,
the probability of being in the first category increases.
In an analogue way, a similar expression can be derived for the highest
category (i.e., for Y = k), which shows that a positive coefficient increases
the probability of being in this category whilst a negative coefficient de-
creases this probability.
No general interpretation is possible for the intermediate categories, as the
direction of the effect depends on the shape of the density function as well
as on the position of the cut-off points.
Nonetheless, keeping these limitations in mind, we can at least get a rough
intuition regarding the direction of the effect from the coefficients derived
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from the ordered probit regression.
Having said this, it is also clear why the interpretation of even the dis-
crete/ marginal effects is still a challenge. Given the fact that these effects
change depending on the value of the other (fixed) independent variables,
it is necessary to evaluate the discrete/marginal effects at meaningful val-
ues. In the case of dummy variables (the company indicators in my case),
neither calculating the marginal effect nor evaluating these variables at
their mean/median is meaningful. Thus, I will set them either to zero
or one and calculate the discrete change between these two values, ac-
cordingly. In the case of the other independent variables, we will have to
restrict ourselves to a set of cases where we would expect major changes
in the effects to occur, knowing that it is impossible to describe all possi-
ble combinations of the variables. For this purpose, I define ideal types of
agents in Section 4.4.2 and compare the probability distribution regarding
their pay satisfaction scores.
As the marginal effects of a certain variable Xi change not only depending
on the level of the other independent variables (which are held constant),
but also on the starting point from where an additional unit of Xi is added,
I will use graphs that show the marginal effects of a certain variable for
each value of this variable. This enables us to evaluate the change of the
effect this specific variable has on the satisfaction score for different levels
of magnitude (see Figure 4.2).
Furthermore, I conduct some goodness-of-fit analyses regarding the pre-
dictions of the model. I will use the coefficients from the ordered probit re-
gression to calculate the predicted probabilities. Then, using the value for
satisfaction with the highest predicted probability, I compare this ”model-
satisfaction” with the actual satisfaction value given in the survey (see
Baum (2006)). Furthermore, I include several competing goodness-of-fit
methods as described by Long & Freese (2006) and discuss their differ-
ences in the course of the robustness discussion in Section 4.4.4.
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4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Data Description
In this chapter, I use a subset of the database described in Chapter 1 that
contains the answers to the question regarding the agents’ overall satis-
faction and satisfaction with pay. In total, I have data from three German
insurance companies with 1,558 observations in this period. As data was
not available for all agents in both years, the actual number of observa-
tions in Table 4.1 slightly varies. To control for company-effects, I include
corresponding dummies in my analysis.
Table 4.1: Mean and standard deviation of key variables (2005)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Overall satisfaction 3.5 (0.8) 1,558
Satifsfaction with compensation 2.9 (1.0) 1,558
Total comp. 2005 58,124.5 (37,251.8) 1,558
New bus. com. 2005 25,852.9 (19,646.5) 1,558
Rec. com. 2005 23,000.6 (16,587.8) 1,558
Bonif. 2005 4,265.8 (4,697.3) 1,558
Fix/subsidies 2005 5,005.2 (5,371.5) 1,558
Age 44.0 (9.2) 1,558
Tenure 11.6 (9.0) 1,558
Diff. total comp. 2005-2004 -13,825.5 (25,371.4) 1,513
Diff. n.b. com. 2005-2004 -14,274.1 (17,794.8) 1,511
Diff. rec. com. 2005-2004 1,040.1 (7,953.0) 1,508
Diff. bonif. 2005-2004 9.1 (4,756.0) 1,410
Diff. Fix/subs. 2005-2004 -988.0 (3,351.1) 1,469
The values for overall satisfaction and satisfaction with compensation are
derived from a questionnaire the agents voluntarily filled-in. The ques-
tion regarding overall satisfaction was ”How satisfied are you overall with
<Company name>?”.55 The question regarding satisfaction with compen-
sation was ”How satisfied are you with your current total compensation? (Total
55 translated from the German question ”Wie zufrieden sind Sie insgesamt mit
<Firmenname>?”
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compensation means the included compensation as new business commission, re-
curring commission, bonification or subsidies)”. 56 In both cases, the answer
could be given on a Likert-scale from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 5 (completely
satisfied). Overall satisfaction is, with a mean of 3.5, slightly higher than
satisfaction with pay, which has a mean of 2.9. The distribution of the
answers is shown in Figure 4.1, from which we can see that overall satis-
faction is indeed skewed to higher satisfaction values compared to com-
pensation satisfaction.
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Figure 4.1: Survey answer frequency regarding overall satisfaction (left)
and satisfaction with pay (right)
The other key variables used in this work are shown in Table 4.1. We
see that the average total income is EUR 58,125, of which approximately
EUR 49,000 comes from commission (53% from new business commis-
sion). Average bonifications are EUR 4,300, but this is the average over all
56 translated from the German question ”Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit Ihrer jetzigen
Gesamtvergu¨tung? (Gesamtvergu¨tung meint dabei alle erhaltenen Vergu¨tungen wie Ab-
schlussprovisionen, Bestandspflegeprovisionen, Bonifikationen oder Zuschu¨sse)”
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agents and one must suppose that not all agents will achieve their goals,
so those that do will receive even higher bonification. Similarly, the av-
erage salary/subsidies of EUR 5,000 may be higher for those agents that
receive the payments with others receiving almost nothing. In both cases,
this also explains the fairly high standard deviation.
The average tenure and age in the sample are 11.6 and 44 years, respec-
tively. The high average tenure may seem surprising, but we must keep in
mind that only the agents who were still with their company at the time
the survey was conducted are represented.
Table 4.1 also lists the average deviation of the compensation components
between 2004 and 2005. It is striking that the total compensation dips sig-
nificantly between these two years, driven by a reduction in new business
commission. This has to be attributed mainly to the increased demand for
life insurance products in 2004, due to a change in regulation by the Ger-
man government. The total sum of bonification paid is unaffected by this
trend. As pointed out above, I only consider those agents who worked
in both years, i.e., excluding agents that joined in 2005, and thus would
expect the total amount of subsidies to decrease.
As the questionnaire was filled-in only once (in 2006), I was not able to
conduct a panel-analysis. Furthermore, due to the voluntary character
of the questionnaire, there is a certain danger of selection-bias which one
needs to keep in mind when interpreting the results.
4.4.2 Effect of Absolute Compensation on Satisfaction
Initially, I will try to validate a finding reported in existing literature. There-
fore, I formulate my first hypothesis based on results from Clark & Oswald
(1996):
Hypothesis 4.1 Agents’ compensation has a strong positive relation with pay
satisfaction and a weak positive one with overall satisfaction
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Table 4.2 shows the results of the ordered probit regression of wage on
overall satisfaction (columns (1) and (2)) and satisfaction with compensa-
tion (columns (3) and (4)). These and all subsequent results are obtained
using robust standard errors. In each case, I ran one regression using only
the total compensation as the independent variable and one with the more
detailed split of the four different compensation components.
Table 4.2: Effect of absolute wage level on compensation satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. sat. Tot. sat. Pay sat. Pay sat.
Total comp. 2005 (’000) -0.000734 0.00700***
(-0.97) (7.29)
New bus. com. 2005 (’000) -0.000162 0.00692**
(-0.07) (2.49)
Rec. com. 2005 (’000) -0.00401 0.00407
(-1.63) (1.28)
Bonif. 2005 (’000) 0.00911 0.0246**
(1.23) (2.43)
Fix/subsidies 2005 (’000) -0.00219 -0.00509
(-0.37) (-0.81)
Age 0.00781** 0.00823** -0.0153*** -0.0148***
(2.19) (2.30) (-4.38) (-4.24)
Tenure -0.0137*** -0.0125*** 0.0158*** 0.0157***
(-3.41) (-2.93) (4.24) (3.92)
Company A 0.0974 0.112 0.349*** 0.365***
(1.15) (1.24) (3.54) (3.42)
Company B 0.602*** 0.667*** 0.631*** 0.751***
(6.12) (5.01) (5.58) (4.54)
N 1558 1558 1558 1558
Log-Likelihood -1763.1 -1761.8 -2061.7 -2057.2
Count R2 0.508 0.507 0.432 0.433
Adj. Count R2 0.00260 0 0.0134 0.0156
McKelvey/ Zavoina’s R2 0.0444 0.0463 0.107 0.112
AIC 3544.3 3547.7 4141.3 4138.4
BIC 3592.4 3611.9 4189.5 4202.7
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown
There is no statistically significant influence of absolute wage on overall
satisfaction (neither in the aggregated nor in the split version of the re-
gression) which supports at least the notion of the second part of the above
hypothesis.57 Also running a Wald-test on the coefficients of the four com-
pensation components yields a p-value of 0.48 and we can not reject the
57 When running the peer-group deviation-dependent analysis, as presented below,
with overall satisfaction as a dependent variable, no statistically significant effects
are observed
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null-hypothesis. Therefore, I will focus mainly on the effect of compensa-
tion on satisfaction with pay. In a first step, we evaluate the results pre-
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Figure 4.2: Marginal effects plot (including 95% confidence-intervals) of
total compensation on satisfaction with pay at the example of Company
A; variables set to their median: Age = 44, Tenure = 10 (compare column
(3) of Table 4.2)
sented in the latter two columns of Table 4.2 based only on the sign of the
coefficients. From the discussion in Section 4.3, we know that care must be
taken when interpreting the coefficient of the different variables. Never-
theless, we can say that there is a statistically significant influence of com-
pensation on agents’ satisfaction with pay. In line with common intuition,
an increase in compensation leads to a higher chance of the agent choos-
ing the highest category of satisfaction instead of the lowest. Interestingly,
when splitting the total compensation into the four sub-categories, we find
a positive effect only for the new business commissions and the bonifica-
tion with the coefficient of the latter being almost three-times as high. This
could already be an indication that agents see bonification as an additional
payment and are therefore more satisfied with their overall pay. Surpris-
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ingly, there is no statistically significant effect coming from the recurring
commissions. With a share of almost 50% of total compensation, we would
expect satisfaction to exhibit a significant dependency on this type of pay.
One explanation might be that the agents are already confident about re-
ceiving their recurring commissions, and therefore react to the driver of
the change (mainly new business), than to the actual change itself.
To understand these first results in more detail, I plot the marginal effects
of different levels of total compensation for Company A in Figure 4.2, with
the other dependent variables from the regression (column (3), Table 4.2),
set to their median being age = 44 and tenure = 10. To get an impression of
the robustness of the results, I also include the upper and lower bounds of
the 95% confidence interval for each of the five satisfaction scores. We see
that, except for satisfaction 5 in the case of high total compensation, the
confidence interval is quite narrow.
From the graph, we can conclude, that the (predicted) probability of an
agent choosing one of the two lowest categories of pay satisfaction be-
comes almost nil as the total compensation increases. At the same time,
the probability of the highest category increases and ends up at almost
50%. The two middle-categories show an inverse bell-shape curve with
peaks at roughly EUR 60,000 and EUR 180,000 for 3 and 4, respectively.
These results further substantiate the first conclusions we drew from look-
ing at the ordered probit regression and add a notion of the steepness and
dynamics of the changes for different levels of total compensation.
Comparable results are achieved when running the same analysis for the
two other companies (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6). The main differences are
in the intercepts and the peak-points of the two middle-categories, but the
overall shape is similar to that discussed above.
Overall, we can support the first part of the hypothesis, as we see a clear
positive relationship between total compensation and satisfaction with
pay. Again, running a Wald test shows that we can reject the null hy-
pothesis that all coefficients are zero.
Having assessed the effect of compensation on satisfaction, we will now
consider more closely the combined effects of changes in several of the
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independent variables. For this purpose, I define ideal types of agents,
based on different specifications of the independent variables. As out-
lined in Section 4.3, the influence of changes in the independent variables
is not linear and thus this method will help us understand how the dis-
tribution of satisfaction scores may change for different types of agents. I
will conduct this analysis using the model-specification as in column (3)
of Table 4.2. I define a total of eight ideal types to capture a wide range
Table 4.3: Predicted probabilities for the average agent and differences for
selected ”ideal types”
Pay satisf. probabilities
Ideal types 1 2 3 4 5
Avg. Company A 10.08% 20.24% 44.51% 22.85% 2.32%
4 Young Rookie 4.28% 3.52% -1.52% -5.34% -0.95%
4 Old Rookie 14.73% 8.19% -8.03% -13.05% -1.84%
4 Rich Retiree -9.42% -16.61% -19.14% 25.97% 19.20%
4 Avg. Low Performer 3.37% 2.87% -1.09% -4.36% -0.80%
4 Avg. High Performer -4.92% -6.13% -1.37% 9.68% 2.74%
4 Avg. Company B -4.14% -4.94% -0.71% 7.74% 2.05%
4 Avg. Company C 7.58% 5.48% -3.33% -8.37% -1.36%
”4” indicates the change in probabilities compared to the average model, shown in the first row
of cases. The details on the definition can be found in Table 4.5. I use an
average agent (i.e., with median tenure, age and total pay) from Company
A as the reference.58 The calculated probabilities for each of the five pos-
sible survey scores are given in the first row of the Table. We find that
the middle-category 3 is the most likely to be chosen, with a 45% chance
that an average agent would choose it whilst the top score of 5 is the least
probable, at roughly 2%. Choosing the lowest category 1 has a probability
of 10%. By calculating the same set of probabilities for the next ideal type
(the Young Rookie) and subtracting the first row, I derive the change in
probabilities for young agents with no income that just started their job.
We find that they are more likely to chose one of the lowest categories.
58 The absolute probabilities for the average agents of each of the three companies cor-
responds to the graphs in Figures 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6 when looking at the intercept of a
(theoretical) line at income = 50 (being the median) and the five curves, respectively
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Even more striking is the result when looking at old agents (50 years) that
just started their job and have no income. In line with intuition, we see a
steep increase in the probability of the lower two categories. Quite con-
trarily, we have the rich retirees next who earn a total of 200,000 EUR per
year and are 65 years old. Here, we have an increase in the probability of
choosing the highest satisfaction category by 19% and even 25% of the sec-
ond highest category. The next two ideal types earn half (low performer)
and twice (high performer) as much as the average whilst keeping age and
tenure at their median. We see a modest increase in the lower categories
for the low and an increase in the upper categories for the high performer.
Finally, the last two ideal types tell us, that, given median age, tenure and
pay, agents working for Company B are more likely to chose a high satis-
faction whilst agents of Company C rather chose a low satisfaction score.
Table 4.4: Effect of absolute wage level on compensation satisfaction
Predicted sat. with compensation
Satifsfaction with compensation 3 4 5 Total
1 152 2 0 154
2 284 8 0 292
3 624 37 0 661
4 345 49 1 395
5 45 11 0 56
Total 1,450 107 1 1,558
To assess the quality of the model, we compare the predicted survey an-
swers with the actual ones. I assign the agent the answer that has the high-
est predicted probability (compare Baum (2006), Long & Freese (2006)).
Table 4.4 shows both the actual and the predicted answers in one matrix
and we see that the simple model with the total compensation as indepen-
dent variable gives us 673 correct predictions out of a total of 1,558 ob-
servations (a hit-rate of 43.2%). The same result is provided by the Count
R2 measure provided at the bottom of the regression tables. In addition,
following Long & Freese (2006), I also report the adjusted count R2 mea-
sure which compares the number of correct predictions with the scenario
where all agents are predicted to have the satisfaction score with the high-
102
est frequency in the sample. Similarly, McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2, Akaike’s
information criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
give other indications regarding the goodness-of-fit. I will use these dif-
ferent measures to compare the different models when discussing the ro-
bustness of the results (4.4.4).
The analysis thus far has focused mainly on compensation-related effects
on satisfaction. However, the coefficients from age and tenure show a re-
markably high statistical significance. Turning back to the regression with
overall satisfaction as dependent variable (columns (1) and (2) of Table
4.2), we see a positive effect from age and a negative effect from tenure.
This is in line with the findings by Grund & Sliwka (2005). For pay satis-
faction, the effect is opposite.
4.4.3 Reference-Point Dependent Satisfaction
The findings thus far are already quite instructive, but we have not yet
investigated the question of a potential reference-point. Due to the spe-
cial structure of the insurance sales process, and the fact that agents are
primarily paid based on commissions, it seems odd to assume that agents
would chose their previous year’s total compensation as a reference-point.
Agents with a low tenure strive to increase their own profit by generating
a lot of new business and expanding their customer stock. In addition, as
already mentioned in Section 4.4.1, the external shock due to the change
in German legislation in 2004 that pushed life insurance sales, makes it
as good as impossible to choose a meaningful baseline in the years 2003–
2005.59
Instead, I use anecdotal evidence that agents of the same company are usu-
ally well-informed as to on the average income of their peers and therefore
59 A test on the influence of deviations from the previous year’s total compensation is
shown in Figure 4.4. As can be seen, no reference-point pattern can be observed.
Running the same analysis for the four compensation categories also yields no pos-
itive results
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have an approximate idea on what they should earn based on their tenure
(some of this information is even made public via company-intern sales
competitions). This is also in line with the approach taken by Ko¨szegi
& Rabin (2006), who propose that agents’ expectation forms a reference-
point. Assuming that this expectation is driven mainly by the income ob-
served at other agents within the same peer-group, we can view the peer-
group-specific reference-point as a special case of an expectation-reference-
point. I therefore formulate the second hypothesis that I will try to validate
with the data:
Hypothesis 4.2 The average income of agents from the same company and the
same peer-group acts as a reference-point for those agents
I first conduct an ordered probit regression (the results are shown in Ta-
ble 4.6).60 Here, the independent variables ∆ always refer to the peer-
group deviation regarding the compensation component as indicated at
the top of each column whilst controlling for the absolute level of all four
compensation categories. This means that the first number in column (1)
represents the coefficient of the dummy variable ”Less than 10% of the
peer-group median of total compensation”, the first number in column (2)
represents the coefficient of the dummy variable ”Less than 10% of the
peer-group median of new business commissions” and so on. From this,
we see that mainly those dummies that indicate a positive deviation from
the peer group have a statistically significant coefficient. In line with the
previous regression using the continuous absolute compensation data, we
again see no statistically significant influence of salary/subsidies on the
satisfaction with pay. In the case of bonification, the only significant coef-
ficient comes from the highest possible, positive category ”> 90%”. This
seems reasonable given the fact that bonification is usually paid to only a
few agents and, therefore, the deviation of those that receive it compared
60 An alternative specification with the deviation from the peer-group median included
in the list of independent variables gives similar results and is not shown here
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to the, rather low, median is quite high.
With the inclusion of the reference-point, we now also see a statistically
significant effect of the recurring commissions, which is reassuring as we
would expect it to play an important role in pay satisfaction due to its high
share of total compensation.
For ease of presentation, I have combined the marginal effects of total com-
pensation and the four sub-categories for Company A in Figure 4.3. Simi-
lar results are found for the other two companies (see Figures 4.8 and 4.9,
only the effect of the total compensation dummies is shown).
In Figure 4.3(a), we see that the probability of choosing one of the top two
satisfaction categories significantly increases beyond the reference-point
and is almost 15 percentage points higher for those agents that have a
more than 90% higher income compared to their peer-group median.61 In
contrast, the probability decreases by only 4 percentage points for agents
with a total compensation below 10% of the peer-group income (i.e., 4 <
−90%). Furthermore, the coefficients of those dummies indicating nega-
tive deviation are statistically not significant. Running a joined Wald test
on all the indicator variables yields a p-value of 0.0002, showing that we
can indeed reject the hypothesis of no influence from the deviation dum-
mies. Virtually the same result is obtained when comparing the nested
models (column (4) of Table 4.2 and column (1) of Table 4.6) via a Likeli-
hood ratio-test. Applying the Wald test only to those dummies indicating
negative deviation, however, results in a p-value of 0.74, and thus we can-
not reject the null hypothesis. On the other hand, the p-value of only the
dummies indicating positive deviation yields a p-value of 0.0118, and we
therefore reject the null hypothesis. Hence, we conclude that the results
support our above hypothesis for positive deviations from the reference-
point.
As outlined in Section 4.1, a common theme accompanying reference points
is the notion of loss aversion. From the results, we see that the data is not
61 An alternate visualization of the results is shown in Figure 4.7. Here, I used the
average predicted satisfaction score on the vertical axis. We again see that positive
deviations result in an increase of up to 0.4 satisfaction points whilst negative devi-
ations have almost no effect
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Figure 4.3: Effect of deviation from peer compensation on satisfaction with
pay (Company A)
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in line with this finding but rather shows that only positive deviations
have a significant influence on the agents’ pay satisfaction. I will discuss
potential explanations for this surprising result in Section 4.5.
When looking at the four compensation components, we find that the
main drivers of the development described for the total compensation
are new business and recurring commissions. The recurring commission
curve in 4.3(c) shows a very characteristic reference-point pattern, as we
see a strong increase of the top three satisfaction categories and a strong
decrease of the bottom two beyond the assumed reference-point of 0% to
10% deviation from the peer-group total compensation.
In the case of bonification, we see the strong positive effect of the high-
est positive deviation category and much lower amplitudes for the others.
This again is in line with the explanation given earlier, i.e., that bonifi-
cation is usually seen as an added extra and thus triggers only positive
changes to satisfaction.62
When interpreting Figure 4.3(e), we have to keep in mind that the regres-
sion showed no statistical significance for any of the dummy variables.
This in itself, though, is also a result that could hint at the fact that salary
and subsidies do not play a major role in determining agents’ satisfaction
with pay. One potential explanation might be that the level of fixed salary
and subsidies is already defined in the employment contract and thus does
not influence the agent’s judgement after joining, as his hopes and fears
are mainly directed towards the variable part of his compensation.
Regarding the model’s goodness-of-fit, we also see an increase in the num-
ber of correctly predicted satisfaction levels. Table 4.7 summarizes the ac-
tual and predicted satisfaction scores for the different specifications shown
in Table 4.6. In direct comparison to the results in Table 4.4, we now find a
total of 690 correct predications compared with 673 from the simple model
that did not use the reference-point dummy variables. The number of cor-
rect predictions of the other compensation components ranges from 675
to 694. The adjusted R2 values are also higher compared to the previous
model.
62 A discussion on how people react to salient events is given in Loewenstein (1996)
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4.4.4 Robustness
After presenting the results of the work, I will now briefly discuss the ro-
bustness of the findings. As already mentioned in Section 4.4.2, I used ro-
bust standard errors throughout this work in order to adjust the results for
heteroscedasticity. Besides the Wald- and LR-test results, which I usually
reported together with the corresponding discussions of the coefficients, I
also conducted the regressions using bootstrapping and jackknife analy-
ses. In both cases, the results remained almost unchanged, with only the
p-values changing slightly.
Regarding the goodness-of-fit measures, we see that the (adjusted) count
R2, the McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2, and the AIC, all show that the inclusion
of the reference-point dummies increases the model’s fit. Only in the case
of the BIC, the results indicate a decrease in the goodness-of-fit.
As we have seen, the results remain consistent and quite stable under dif-
ferent specifications of the independent variables. Even running an OLS
regression (despite all the caveats of OLS in the case of categorical vari-
ables) yields similar results.
Finally, as already indicated in Section 4.3, I also test the parallel regres-
sion assumption. As the results show that we can in fact reject the hy-
pothesis that all coefficients are the same for all satisfaction scores (and
strictly could not use ordered probit, see Long & Freese (2006)), I also ran
the above analyses using a generalized ordered probit regression. Again,
we find similar behavior and thus stick to the more common (and easier
to interpret) simple ordered probit regression.
Besides these rather technical aspects, we also see that significant results
are obtained only when using the pay satisfaction scores. This can also be
interpreted as a sign of robustness and that the effects observed are indeed
specific to compensation.
Overall, I conclude that the results are quite robust as the analysis of vari-
ous specifications has shown.
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyzed the influence of compensation on both over-
all and pay satisfaction. Furthermore, I investigated the existence of a
reference-point that drives agents’ pay satisfaction.
I use a data-set of German tied insurance agents of three companies and
find that, in line with other studies, the absolute level of compensation
drives the satisfaction with pay but has no influence on overall satisfac-
tion. Furthermore, I find supporting evidence for the assumption that
agents judge their own income based on a reference-point. In spite of
the predictions from common labor market literature, this reference-point
is not the previous year’s income but instead the income of the agent’s
peer group (which includes agents at the same company and within the
same tenure cluster). Surprisingly, I find no evidence for loss aversion of
the agent (which would mean a higher sensitivity of pay satisfaction for
under-average income compared to above-average income) but instead
the opposite. For the two commission types under consideration (new
business and recurring commissions), we see a strong positive impact on
the upper satisfaction scores of above-average performance and only a
moderate (and statistically not significant) influence of below-average per-
formance. Variations in the model specification prove the robustness of the
results.
A potential explanation for these unexpected results might lie in the spe-
cial profession under consideration. As insurance tied agents usually have
a strong entrepreneurial spirit, the results might reflect the nature of many
sales people to focus on the successes than on the failures of their work.
Furthermore, a certain affinity to stick to average scores in questionnaires
might have resulted in less satisfied agents to nevertheless give an average
score, while very satisfied agents will not shy away from selecting a score
from the upper part of the range. Finally, agents probably perceive their
achievement/failure against set goals in quite diverse ways. As pointed
out in the recent study by Kahneman & Thaler (2006), the choices made
by agents depend on expectations as to what their compensation should
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be. Thus, if there is a systematic bias on how the agents predict or per-
ceive their peers’ income development, it might be that they more often
feel they are above average, leading to higher pay satisfaction scores.
I contribute to the recent research regarding reference-dependent satisfac-
tion of employees and show that, in this case, a different specification
might be a more reasonable reference-point. By focusing on insurance
agents, we have a clear link between performance and pay, which enables
us to study the pure economic effects under consideration in the spirit of
Fehr & Schmidt (2004). Furthermore, I hope to push the use of marginal
effects analyses that extend the insights drawn from regression models for
categorical dependent variables. The methods presented in this work help
develop a better understanding of the dependency of the probabilities for
different answer categories.
Even though the concept of peer-group specific reference points seems in-
tuitively reasonable, it should be noted that it implies a rather high degree
of transparency on agents’ compensation. Even though this is a reason-
able assumption in the case of insurance tied agents, one has to be careful
when applying this concept to other industries.
Nevertheless, future research should try to validate the findings I present,
using data from other industries to either prove or falsify the theory of
peer-group-dependent reference points.
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4.6 Appendix to Chapter 4
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Figure 4.4: Test on last years total compensation as reference-point (Com-
pany A); variables set to their median
Table 4.5: Definition of ideal types of agents as used in Table 4.3
Ideal types Company Age* Tenure* Total pay**
Avg. Company A A 44 10 50
Young Rookie A 25 0 0
Old Rookie A 50 0 0
Rich Retiree A 65 40 200
Avg. Low Performer A 44 10 25
Avg. High Performer A 44 10 100
Avg. Company B B 44 10 50
Avg. Company C C 44 10 50
* in years, ** in ’000 EUR
111
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Total income
Pr(pay sat=1) Pr(pay sat=2) Pr(pay sat=3)
Pr(pay sat=4) Pr(pay sat=5)
Company B
Figure 4.5: Marginal effects plot (including 95% confidence-intervals) of
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isfaction with pay (Company C); variables set to their median
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Table 4.6: Effect of compensation deviations on compensation satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total New Rec. Boni Subs.
∆ < −90% -0.157 -0.0318 0.0803 -0.0501 -0.257
(-0.47) (-0.09) (0.36) (-0.30) (-1.22)
−90% ≤ ∆ ≤ −70% -0.171 -0.305 -0.0139 -0.0576 -0.138
(-0.73) (-1.63) (-0.06) (-0.39) (-0.89)
−70% ≤ ∆ < −50% -0.209 -0.0560 -0.0925 -0.139 -0.0797
(-1.39) (-0.39) (-0.60) (-0.97) (-0.61)
−50% ≤ ∆ < −30% -0.117 -0.223* 0.0703 -0.187 -0.0807
(-0.96) (-1.68) (0.58) (-1.34) (-0.61)
−30% ≤ ∆ < −10% -0.178 -0.279** 0.0390 0.0875 -0.0527
(-1.63) (-2.36) (0.33) (0.61) (-0.45)
−10% ≤ ∆ < 0% -0.0437 -0.125 0.0631 -0.0439 0.0400
(-0.35) (-0.90) (0.48) (-0.27) (0.27)
10% ≤ ∆ < 30% 0.308*** 0.0734 0.263** -0.0480 0.00193
(2.63) (0.58) (2.12) (-0.31) (0.01)
30% ≤ ∆ < 50% 0.201 0.274* 0.313** 0.176 0.0574
(1.52) (1.91) (2.24) (1.08) (0.38)
50% ≤ ∆ < 70% 0.332** 0.292** 0.363** 0.0831 0.151
(2.25) (2.04) (2.39) (0.48) (0.98)
70% ≤ ∆ < 90% 0.419*** 0.372** 0.283* 0.179 0.0904
(2.61) (2.24) (1.80) (0.97) (0.57)
90% ≤ ∆ 0.520*** 0.480*** 0.302* 0.409*** 0.134
(3.12) (2.87) (1.88) (2.64) (0.95)
New bus. com. 2005 (’000) 0.00239 -0.00120 0.00718*** 0.00685*** 0.00556*
(0.83) (-0.40) (2.63) (2.58) (1.95)
Rec. com. 2005 (’000) -0.00243 0.00145 -0.00259 0.00429 0.00387
(-0.74) (0.48) (-0.62) (1.45) (1.23)
Bonif. 2005 (’000) 0.0223** 0.0253*** 0.0268*** -0.00524 0.0259***
(2.35) (2.75) (2.67) (-0.45) (2.60)
Fix/subsidies 2005 (’000) -0.0173** -0.0133** -0.00618 -0.00907 -0.0175*
(-2.55) (-2.05) (-0.99) (-1.44) (-1.88)
Age -0.0154*** -0.0143*** -0.0150*** -0.0152*** -0.0148***
(-4.36) (-4.06) (-4.27) (-4.33) (-4.25)
Tenure 0.0216*** 0.0197*** 0.0201*** 0.0182*** 0.0150***
(5.29) (4.88) (4.62) (4.48) (3.72)
Company A 0.369*** 0.316*** 0.395*** 0.369*** 0.341***
(3.39) (2.90) (3.65) (3.39) (3.14)
Company B 0.935*** 0.754*** 0.903*** 0.870*** 0.818***
(5.64) (4.67) (5.13) (5.33) (4.87)
N 1558 1558 1558 1558 1558
Log-Likelihood -2039.1 -2034.4 -2049.3 -2041.7 -2053.9
Count R2 0.443 0.445 0.436 0.445 0.433
Adj. Count R2 0.0323 0.0368 0.0212 0.0368 0.0156
McKelvey/ Zavoina’s R2 0.135 0.141 0.123 0.132 0.117
AIC 4124.3 4114.8 4144.7 4129.5 4153.7
BIC 4247.4 4237.9 4267.7 4252.6 4276.8
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Constant not shown. Agents with a deviation of 0%−+10%
and Company C used as reference categories.
Tenure clusters of 5 years used to calculate median and deviation of this median.
Table 4.7: Predicted compensation satisfaction based on model specifica-
tions as outlined in Table 4.6
Based on Table 4.6, Column (1) Predicted sat. with compensation
Satifsfaction with compensation 1 3 4 5 Total
1 3 148 3 0 154
2 2 281 8 1 292
3 1 616 44 0 661
4 0 324 71 0 395
5 0 37 19 0 56
Total 6 1,406 145 1 1,558
Based on Table 4.6, Column (2) Predicted sat. with compensation
Satifsfaction with compensation 1 3 4 5 Total
1 5 148 1 0 154
2 2 280 10 0 292
3 1 611 49 0 661
4 1 315 78 1 395
5 0 37 19 0 56
Total 9 1,391 157 1 1,558
Based on Table 4.6, Column (3) Predicted sat. with compensation
Satifsfaction with compensation 1 3 4 5 Total
1 2 150 2 0 154
2 2 284 5 1 292
3 1 623 37 0 661
4 1 338 55 1 395
5 0 43 13 0 56
Total 6 1,438 112 2 1,558
Based on Table 4.6, Column (4) Predicted sat. with compensation
Satifsfaction with compensation 1 3 4 Total
1 4 147 3 154
2 1 276 15 292
3 1 622 38 661
4 1 326 68 395
5 0 40 16 56
Total 7 1,411 140 1,558
Based on Table 4.6, Column (5) Predicted sat. with compensation
Satifsfaction with compensation 1 3 4 5 Total
1 0 152 2 0 154
2 0 285 6 1 292
3 1 626 34 0 661
4 1 343 49 2 395
5 0 42 14 0 56
Total 2 1,448 105 3 1,558
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